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FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIPS ARE NOT
CONTRACTS
ScoTr F1TZGIBBON*
The greatestgood for humans consists in relationsof mutual good faith.
Decree of Delphi, 125 B.C.1
I. INTRODUCTION
We ought to call one province of the law "Affiliations," or perhaps
"Relationships." Contract law is one of its parts. Another is fiduciary
law-the law governing attorneys, trustees, guardians, corporate directors, and partners. Fiduciary law delineates the ways in which such relationships arise and identifies the standards of conduct to which a fiduciary must conform, including requirements of loyalty, zeal, and selfsacrifice.
A fundamental change in the jurisprudence and ethics of affiliations
is underway, or at least several prominent writers are attempting to
work such a change. An insurgent theory asserts that fiduciary relationships are really contractual in nature. Judge Easterbrook and Professor
Fischel tell us: "Fiduciary duties are not special duties; they have no
moral footing; they are the same sort of obligations, derived and enforced in the same way, as other contractual undertakings."2
* J.D., Harvard, 1970. B.C.L., Oxford, 1972. Professor, Boston College Law School.
Professor James Gordley, Shannon Cecil Turner Professor of Jurisprudence, School of Law,
University of California at Berkeley, and Professors Michael Ansaldi, Frank Herrmann,
Sanford Katz, Thomas Kohler, James Repetti, and Aviam Soifer of Boston College Law
School provided assistance with this article. I am grateful to the Earhart Foundation for financial assistance.
1. G. DAUX, DELPHES Au IIE Au IESIECLE 369 (1936), quoted in 3 CESLAS SPICQ,
THEOLOGICAL LEXICON OF THE NEW TESTAMENT 115 (James D. Ernest, ed., 1994).

2. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contractand FiduciaryDuty, 36(1) J.L. &

MARQ UETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82:303

Of course, fiduciary relationships do have an important feature in
common with loan transactions, purchases and sales of goods and the
like: namely, that they are (usually) entered into and perpetuated voluntarily. Having this important feature in common, these sorts of relationships and others as well-marriage, for example--can reasonably be
organized together as part of a genus.
Perhaps some contractualist
thinkers intend no more than to point this out, and to propose that we
use the word "contract" as the name for this genus. (Usage sometimes
supports such an approach, as in the terms "marriage contract" and
"partnership contract.") The world does not need a full-blown law review article on this purely lexical proposal and this Article does not de-

ECON. 425,427 (1993) [hereinafter Contractand FiduciaryDuty].
Scholars of non- or antieconomic bent have had trouble coming up with a unifying
approach to fiduciary duties because they are looking for the wrong things. They
are looking for something special about fiduciary relations. There is nothing special
to find. There are only distinctive and independently interesting questions about
particular consensual (and thus contractual) relations.... Searching for the right
definition of a fiduciary duty is not a special puzzle. In short, there is no subject
here, and efforts to unify it on a ground that presumes its distinctiveness are
doomed.
Id at 438. See John H. Langbein, The ContractarianBasis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE
L.J. 625, 629 (1995) ("despite decades of pulpit-thumping rhetoric about the sanctity of fiduciary obligations, fiduciary duties in trust law are unambiguously contractarian. The rules of
trust fiduciary law mean to capture the likely understanding of the parties to the trust deal ...
"); Roberta Romano, Comment on Easterbrook and Fischel, "Contract and FiduciaryDuty,"
36(1) J.L. & ECON. 447 (1993). Judge Posner is also an advocate of this set of doctrines. See
his dissent in Jordan v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429,444-52 (7th Cir. 1987). See generally
Market St. Assoc. v. Frey, 941 F.2d 588, 595 (7th Cir. 1991) (Posner, J.) ("Despite its moralistic overtones [the duty of good faith] ... is no more the injection of moral principles into contract law than the fiduciary concept itself is."). IL See generally Henry Hansmann & Hugo
Mattei, The Functions of Trust Law: A Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis, 73
N.Y.U. L. REV. 434 (1998).
[Tihe most important contribution of the law of trusts is that it facilitates the partitioning of assets into bundles that can conveniently be pledged separately to different classes of creditors. Of particular importance in this respect is the use of trust
law to shield trust assets from claims of the trustee's personal creditors.... [T]he
creation and enforcement of fiduciary duties, seems a relatively unimportant reason
for maintaining a separate law of trusts.
Id. at 438. But see Victor Brudney, Contractand FiduciaryDuty in CorporateLaw, 38 B.C. L.
REv. 595 (1997) [hereinafter Brudney, Contractand Fiduciary];Victor Brudney, Corporate
Governance, Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1403 (1985)
[hereinafter Brudney, Corporate Governance]; Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Duties as Default
Rules, 74 OR. L. REV. 1209, 1242-51 (1995).
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bate it.
But fiduciary relationships also have important features which differ
from those of loan transactions and agreements for the purchase and
sale of goods. Though fiduciary relationships may, like marriage relationships, be part of the same genus, they are, like marriage relationships, members of a different species. They differ in doctrinal structure.
They differ in ethical basis. Some contractualist writing, going beyond
suggestions as to lexical definition, denies one or the other of these two
propositions. This Article aims to establish that both are true.
This Article explores the nature of fiduciary relationships, shows
that they arise and function in ways alien to contractualist thought, and
that they have value and serve purposes unknown to the contractualists.
Notably, that they facilitate the doing of justice, that they promote virtue, and that they enhance freedom in a distinctive way.
Fiduciarist contractualism is the product of economic analysis of the
law and thus suffers from the shallowness of "lawyer's economics."
Economic analysis in this area is a branch of welfare economics and suffers from the shallowness of "economists' ethics." This Article takes a
close look at the professional literature in ethics and economics and
demonstrates that the "fiduciary as contract" enterprise is built on an
unsound theoretical foundation: Neither classic pleasure-based utilitarianism nor its economic preference-based version justifies the project.
"Explaining" things by reducing them to contract is a major academic industry.3 Sex, romance, marriage, and other family relationships
have been approached this way.4 So has criminal justice! So has the
State, in a leading tradition of political theory.' Because the trend is underway in so many areas, we should spread a broader canvas.
We ought to develop a theory of affiliations. What is the architec3. See Langbein, supra note 2, at 630 ("Contract has become the dominant doctrinal current in modern American law. In fields ranging from corporations and partnership, to landlord and tenant, to servitudes, to the law of marriage, scholars have come to understand our
legal rules as resting mainly on imputed bargains that are susceptible to alteration by actual
bargains.").
4. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON (1992) [hereinafter POSNER, SEX
AND REASON]; RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW ch. 5 (4th ed. 1992)
[hereinafter POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS]. See generally Sanford N. Katz, Marriageas
Partnership,73 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1251 (1998); GARY S. BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE
FAMILY (1981).
5. See POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 4, at ch. 7.
6. On the other hand, fiduciary concepts also make an appearance in accounting for the
nature of political authority. See, ag., J.W. GOUGH, JOHN LOCKE'S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
136-71 (1956) (discussing the idea of trusteeship in political theory).
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ture of affiliations? When is one affiliation the same as another? What

are the ethics of affiliations? Why should someone have duties to an affiliate-duties above and beyond those we all have even to strangers?
What is the psychology and the anthropology of affiliations? This Article clears the field of one approach and suggests others.
II. INTRODUCTION TO FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIPS

Read the following catalogue of fiduciary categories and principles
and derive from it a feel for what makes fiduciary relationships special.
An attorney is a fiduciary for a client,7 a corporate director8 or offi9
cer for the corporation or its shareholders, a promoter for the corpora-

tion,10 an agent for the principal,' a guardian for the ward,12 joint venturers for one another, 3 a partner for the other partners, l* a bailee for the
7. See United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 568 (2d Cir. 1991) (dictum); FDIC v.
Mmahat, 907 F.2d 546 (5th Cir. 1990); Croce v. Kurnit, 565 F. Supp. 884 (S.D.N.Y. 1982);
David Welch Co. v. Erskine & Tulley, 250 Cal. Rptr. 339, 341 (Ct. App. 1988) ("The relation
between attorney and client is a fiduciary relation of the very highest character, and binds the
attorney to most conscientious fidelity-uberrimafides.") (quoting Cox v. Delmas, 33 P. 836,
839 (Cal. 1893)); STEPHAN GILLERS & NORMAN DORSEN, REGULATION OF LAWYERS:
PROBLEMS OF LAW AND ETHICS 409-10 (2d ed. 1989).

8. See Chestman, 947 F.2d at 560; Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46, 49 (2d Cir. 1954)
(Hand, J.); Paramount Communications, Inc. v. PVC Network, 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994); Guth
v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939); AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:

ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, Part V, Introductory

Note (1986) [hereinafter ALI PRINCIPLES]; R. SOUTHGATE & D. GLAZER,
MASSACHUSETTS CORPORATION LAW & PRACTICE 241-61 (1992). But cf. REVISED
MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.30, cmt. (1984) ("Section 8.30 does not use the term 'fiduciary'
in the standard for directors' conduct, because that term could be confused with the unique
attributes and obligations of a fiduciary imposed by the law of trusts, some of which are not
appropriate for directors of a corporation."). See generally Harold J. Marsh, Are Directors
Trustees? Conflict of Interest and CorporateMorality, 22 BUS. LAW. 35 (1966).
9. See Chestman, 947 F.2d at 568; Guth, 5 A.2d at 510; ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 8.
10. See Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co. v. Bigelow, 89 N.E. 193, 206
(Mass. 1909) affd, 225 U.S. 111 (1912); ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 17.1,
at 716 (1986).
11. See Union Miniere, S.A. v. Parday Corp., 521 N.E.2d 700 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988).
12- See In re Estate of Swiecicki, 477 N.E.2d 488, 490 (II1.1985); Michael D. Casasanto et
al., A Model Code of Ethics for Guardians,11 WHITTIER L. REV. 543, 555 (1989); Kyle A.
Orsini, Note, Guardian of a Minor's Estate: How FarCan the Guardian Go in Expending the
Minor's Money?, 8 CONN. PROB. L.J. 275,279 (1994).
13. See Finley v. Marathon Oil Co., 75 F.3d 1225, 1229 (7th Cir. 1996); Eagle-Picher Co.
v. Mid-Continent Lead & Zinc Co., 209 F.2d 917, 919 (10th Cir. 1954); Libby v. L.J. Corp., 247
F.2d 78, 81 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (Burger, J.) ("The relationship of joint adventurers gives rise to
certain reasonably well-defined fiduciary duties and obligations. The duty imposed is essentially one of good faith, fair and open dealing and the utmost of candor and disclosure to all
concerned."); Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545,546 (N.Y. 1928).
14. See Latta v. Kilbourn, 150 U.S. 524, 543 (1893) (stating that partners are in an
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bailor, s a securities broker for a customer,16 a member of a creditor's
committee for the creditors," and, in class action lawsuits, the representative of a class for its members." According to some authorities, a physician i'9 or a psychiatriste may be a fiduciary for a patient, an employee
for his employer,2' a stockholder for the other stockholders in a closely
held corporation,' and a priest for a penitent.2 Other instances are oc"agency or fiduciary relation in respect to the business of the firm"); Wartski v. Bedford, 926
F.2d 11, 13 (1st Cir. 1991); In re USACafes, L.P., 600 A.2d 43 (Del. Ch. 1991); Helmore v.
Smith, 35 Ch. D. 436, 444 (1887) (Bacon V.C.) ("I cannot conceive of a stronger case of fiduciary relation than that which exists between partners. Their mutual confidence is the life
blood of the concern. It is because they trust one another that they are partners in the first
instance; it is because they continue to trust one another that business goes on."); Daniel J.
Weidner, Three Policy Decisions Animate Revisions of Uniform PartnershipAct, 46 Bus.

LAW. 427 (1991); Note, Fiduciary Duties of Partners, 48 IOWA L. REV. 902 (1963).

Cf

UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 21 (1914) (entitled "Partner Accountable as a Fiduciary").

15. See Hospital Products Ltd. v. United States Surgical Corp. (Austl. 1984) 156 C.L.R.
41; Re Hallett's Estate, 13 Ch. D 696,708-09 (1880).
16. See Duffy v. Cavalier, 264 Cal. Rptr. 740, 754 (Ct. App. 1989); In re E.F. Hutton &
Co., Exchange Act Release No. 25887, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 84,303 (July 6, 1988). See
generally Romano v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 834 F.2d 523, 530 (5th Cir. 1987)
("[tihe nature of the fiduciary duty owed will vary, depending on the relationship between the
broker and the investor."); United States v. Dial, 757 F.2d 163 (7th Cir. 1985) (commodities
broker).
17. See Robert C. Pozen & Judy K. Mencher, Chinese Walls for Creditors' Committees,
48 Bus. LAw. 747,749 (1993).
18. See Sylvia R. Lazos, Note, Abuse in PlaintiffClassAction Settlements: The Need for
a GuardianDuringPretrialSettlement Negotiations,84 MICH. L. REV. 308,318 (1985).
19. See Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (1990). Cf.HospitalProducts
Ltd., 156 C.L.R. at 69 ("[T]he relation of physician and patient... may be described as fiduciary when the question is whether there is a presumption of undue influence, but may be less
likely to be relevant when an alleged conflict between duty and interest is in question.") (dictum).
20. Psychiatrists are characterized as having "recently become members of the fiduciary
group" in Tamar Frankel, FiduciaryLaw, 71 CAL. L. REV. 795,796 (1983).
21. The major authorities for this view are from Commonwealth countries. In Hospital
ProductsLtd v. United States Surgical Corp. (Austl. 1984) 156 C.L.R. 41, the Australian High
Court stated in dictum that the relationship between master and servant is fiduciary in nature.
The master-servant relationship is referred to as fiduciary in Reading v. Attorney-General,
1951 App. Cas. 507 (H.L.) (opinion of Lord Porter). In the United States, a more robust,
contractarian attitude emerged. See ROBERT J. STEINFELD, THE INVENTION OF FREE
LABOR: THE EMPLOYMENT RELATION IN ENGLISH AND AMERICAN LAW AND CULTURE,

1350-1870, at 129 (1991).
A public employee may be a fiduciary for his employer (or for the public). See City of
Boston v. Santosuosso, 10 N.E.2d 271, 275 (Mass. 1937). See generally Nussbaum v. Weeks,
263 Cal. Rptr. 360,364 (Ct. App. 1989) (stating in dictum that a public official had a fiduciary
duty to constituents).
22. See Alaska Plastics, Inc. v. Coppock, 621 P.2d 270 (Alaska 1980); Comolli v. Comolli,
246 S.E.2d 278 (Ga. 1978); Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975),
limited by Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 663 (Mass. 1976). But
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casionally mentioned.'
A fiduciary must be beneficent. He must be zealous to serve the interests of the beneficiary.' He has an especially high duty of disclosure:
He must go beyond avoiding fraud and false statements; he is obliged to
"volunteer" information." He must treat beneficiary confidences with
see Citron v. Steego Corp., No. CIV. A. 10171, 1988 WL 44738 (Del. Ch. Sept. 9, 1988) (refusing to impose fiduciary duties on a 40% stockholder). See generally2 F. HODGE O'NEAL
& ROBERT B. THOMPSON, OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS § 10.04 (2d ed.
1985); Lawrence B. Mitchell, The Death of FiduciaryDuty in Close Corporations,138 U. PA.
L. REV. 1675 (1990).
Justice Douglas once stated, in an opinion for the Court, that "a dominant or controlling
stockholder" is charged with a fiduciary duty. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306 (1939).
This is certainly not the general law, although California courts have gone some distance in
that direction. See, e.g., Jones v. H.I. Ahmanson & Co., 460 P.2d 464 (1969). Shareholders
who participate in management or exercise the powers of directors or officers may become
subject to fiduciary duties. See McDaniel v. Painter, 418 F.2d 545, 547 (10th Cir. 1969). See
generally ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 8 ("A controlling shareholder ... is ... subject to a
duty of fair dealing.").
23. See Hospital ProductsLtd, 156 C.L.R. at 69 ("[Tlhe relation of... priest and penitentf_ may be described as fiduciary when the question is whether there is a presumption of
undue influence, but may be less likely to be relevant when an alleged conflict between duty
and interest is in question.") (dictum).
24. Oil field operators are fiduciaries for owners in some states. See Fransen v. Conoco,
Inc., 64 F.3d 1481, 1487 (10th Cir. 1995) (dictum). Tenants for life are fiduciaries for remaindermen according to Hospital Products Ltd, 156 C.L.R. 41, and Moore v. Phillips, 627 P.2d
831, 834 (Kan. Ct. App. 1981). Co-tenants who acquire concurrently are "held to be subject
to fiduciary duties with respect to their dealings with the common property" according to
ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM, ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 5.10 (student ed. 1984). Creditors have been held to be fiduciaries for borrowers under certain circumstances. Union leaders are characterized as fiduciaries in Frankel, Fiduciary Law, supra note 20, at 796. Investment advisers were held to be fiduciaries under limited circumstances in Burdett v. Miller, 957
F.2d 1375, 1381 (7th Cir. 1992) (Posner, J.). Some courts have discussed whether franchisors
are fiduciaries. See, e.g., Original Great Am. Chocolate Chip Cookie Co. v. River Valley
Cookies, Ltd., 970 F.2d 273, 280 (7th Cir. 1992) (Posner, J.) (holding that they are not fiduciaries); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Rubenfeld, 339 N.Y.S.2d 623, 632 (Civ. Ct. 1972), aff'd, 357
N.Y.S.2d 589 (App. Term. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 370 N.Y.S.2d 943 (App. Div. 1975),
affd, 358 N.E.2d 882 (N.Y. 1976). See also Easterbrook & Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary
Duty, supra note 2, at 438 n.24; Harold Brown, Franchising-A Fiduciary Relationship, 49
TEX. L. REV. 650 (1971).
25. A corporate director, for example, must "affirmatively protect the interests of the
corporation committed to his charge." Guth v. Loft, Inc., 9 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939) (dictum). The lawyer's duty of zealous representation is imposed by Canon 7 of the MODEL
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT, Rule 1.3 cmt. ("A lawyer should act with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf.").
26. See Libby v. L.J. Corp., 247 F.2d 78, 81 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (Burger, J.) ("The duty imposed [upon joint adventurers] is essentially one of good faith, fair and open dealing and the
utmost of candor and disclosure to all concerned."); Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal.,
793 P.2d 479, 483 (Cal. 1990) (holding that as a fiduciary a physician has a duty to disclose his
"personal interests unrelated to the patient's health."); Day v. Rosenthal, 217 Cal. Rptr. 89,
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the highest respect.2 His duty of "good faith" is especially strongstronger than that which applies in commercial arrangements
generally.' He is sometimes required to refrain from competing with
the beneficiary,0 from taking the beneficiary's "opportunities, 31 from
profiting from transactions with the beneficiary, 32 from developing other
103 (Ct. App. 1985) (stating that ethical standards require of an attorney "full and fair disclosure to the [client] of all facts which materially affect his rights and interests.") (dictum);
Rosenthal v. Rosenthal, 543 A.2d 348,352 (Me. 1988) (holding that business fiduciaries have
a duty "[t]o disclose and not withhold from one another relevant information affecting the
status and affairs of the relationship"); Herring v. Offutt, 295 A.2d 876, 879 (Md. 1972) (stating that each member of a partnership has an obligation "to make full disclosure of all known
information that is significant and material to the affairs or property of the partnership.");
REVISED UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT § 305 (1976).
27. The Second Circuit recently characterized this duty as one "not to use or to communicate information confidentially given him by the [beneficiary] or acquired by him during the
course of or on account of his [fiduciary status]." United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551,
569 (2d Cir. 1991) (citation omitted). The lawyer's duties with respect to the confidences of
his client are established by Canon 4 of the MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY and by Rule 1.6 of the MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY.
See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW: THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, ch. 5 (1998) [hereinafter THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS]; see also ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 8, at § 5.04 (directors and executives) and § 5.11 (controlling stockholders).
28. See Union Miniere, S.A. v. Parday Corp., 521 N.E.2d 700, 703 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988)
("utmost good faith"); Rosenthal v. Rosenthal, 543 A.2d 348, 352 (Me. 1988) (good faith with
a view to "furthering the interests of one another" as to the matters within the scope of the
relationship); Weidner, supra note 14, at 461 ("[T]here is authority that suggests that the duty
of good faith will be given a much more powerful reading in the partnership context."). Cf.
Kham & Nate's Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank, 908 F.2d 1351, 1357 (7th Cir. 1990) (Easterbrook, J.) (applying a limited interpretation of the good faith requirement to a lender bank on
the grounds that "[p]arties to a contract are not each others' fiduciaries").
29. On the duty of good faith imposed on contracting parties even when they are not
fiduciaries, see Capital Options Investments, Inc. v. Goldberg Bros. Commodities, Inc., 958
F.2d 186 (7th Cir. 1992); Teachers Ins. & Annuity Assoc. v. Butler, 626 F. Supp. 1229

(S.D.N.Y. 1986), affd, 803 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1986); U.C.C. § 1-203 (1997) ("Every contract or
duty within this Act imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement.");
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981) ("Every contract imposes upon each
party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement."). The difference between the contract-law requirement of good faith and that arising from the fiduciary relationship is discussed in John C. Coffee, Jr., The Mandatory/EnablingBalance in Corporate Law: An Essay on the JudicialRole, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1618, 1658 (1989) (stating

that the main difference is that a "contracting party may seek to advance his own interests in
good faith while a fiduciary may not"); E. Allan Farnsworth, Your Loss or My Gain? The
Dilemma of the DisgorgementPrinciplein Breach of Contract,94 YALE L.J. 1339,1356 (1985)

(stating that the major difference is that "the disgorgement principle applies to breach of a
fiduciary obligation while the expectation principle applies to a breach of contractual obligation"). See Katz v. Oak Indus., Inc., 508 A.2d 873 (Del. Ch. 1986).
30. See In re E.F. Hutton & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 25887, Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) T 84,303 (July 6, 1988) ("It is hornbook law that, absent disclosure and a contrary
agreement, a fiduciary cannot compete with his beneficiary with respect to the subject matter
of their relationship."). Restrictions on competition by corporate directors and senior executives are expressed in ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 8, at § 5.06.
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transactions with the beneficiary, 32 from developing other adverse interests, 33 and even from profiting for himself in other ways, 4 at least in matters related to the fiduciary relationship. His dealings with a potential
beneficiary-even preliminary dealings-readily put him under fiduciary obligations, and he is restricted in his right to terminate the relationship. 5 The importance of his obligations has been strongly emphasized
by the New York Court of Appeals:
[I]t is elemental that a fiduciary owes a duty of undivided and
undiluted loyalty to those whose interests the fiduciary is to protect. This is a sensitive and 'inflexible' rule of fidelity, . . . requiring avoidance of situations in which a fiduciary's personal interest possibly conflicts with the interest of those owed a
fiduciary duty.... [A] fiduciary.., is bound to single-mindedly
pursue the interests of those to whom a duty of loyalty is
owed .... 36

31. For discussions of similar problems for corporate directors and officers, see ALI
PRINCIPLES, supra note 8, at § 5.05; ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW chs. 5 & 7

(1986); Victor Brudney & Robert Charles Clark, A New Look at Corporate Opportunities,94
HARV. L. REV. 997 (1981).
For restrictions on controlling shareholders, see ALI
PRINCIPLES, supra note 8, at § 5.12.
32. See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 8, at § 5.02.
33. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (Canon 5); MODEL

RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 1.7-1.9; THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, supra
note 27, at ch. 8.
34. See In re Estate of Swiecicki, 477 N.E.2d 488 (Ill. 1985); see also Rosenthal v. Rosenthal, 543 A.2d 348, 352 (Me. 1988) (stating that directors and partners may "not use their position, influence or knowledge respecting the affairs and organization that are subject to the
relationship to gain any special privilege or advantage over the other person or persons involved in the relationship"); ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 8, at § 5.04. Section 21(1) of the
REVISED UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT provides:

Every partner must account to the partnership for any benefit, and hold as trustee
for it any profits derived by him without the consent of the other partners from any
transaction connected with the formation, conduct, or liquidation of the partnership
or from any use by him of its property.
See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 387 (1988) ("Unless otherwise agreed,
an agent is subject to a duty to his principal to act solely for the benefit of the principal in all
matters connected with his agency.").
35. Limits on an attorney's right to withdraw from representation are imposed by Disciplinary Rule 2-110 of the MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY and Rule 1.16
of the MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT. Partners are also subject to restrictions
on withdrawal. See Weidner, supra note 14, at 431-53 and authorities cited therein.
36. Birnbaum v. Birnbaum, 539 N.E.2d 574, 576 (N.Y. 1989) (citations omitted). Another general statement of the duty of loyalty is the following from Guth v. Lof4 Inc., 5 A.2d
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The classic statement is that of Justice Cardozo:
Joint adventurers, like copartners, owe to one another, while
the enterprise continues, the duty of the finest loyalty. Many
forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those acting at arm's length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary
ties. A trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of
the market place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an
honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior. As to
this there has developed a tradition that is unbending and inveterate. Uncompromising rigidity has been the attitude of courts
of equity when petitioned to undermine the rule of undivided
loyalty by the "disintegrating erosion" of particular exceptions.... Only thus has the level of conduct for fiduciaries been
kept at a level higher than that trodden by the crowd. It will not
consciously be lowered by any judgment of this court ...
Salmon had put himself in a position in which thought of self was
to be renounced, however hard the abnegation.'
Courts regard themselves as chartered to develop new doctrines and, in
some areas, to exercise an ongoing supervisory authority over fiduciar503,510 (Del. 1939):
A public policy, existing through the years, and derived from a profound knowledge
of human characteristics and motives, has established a rule that demands of a corporate officer or director, peremptorily and inexorably, the most scrupulous observance of his duty, not only affirmatively to protect the interests of the corporation
committed to his charge, but also to refrain from doing anything that would work
injury to the corporation, or to deprive it of profit or advantage which his skill and
ability might properly bring to it, or to enable it to make in the reasonable and lawful exercise of its powers. The rule that requires an undivided and unselfish loyalty
to the corporation demands that there shall be no conflict between duty and selfinterest.
37. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546-48 (N.Y. 1928) (citations omitted). Other
general statements are contained in Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939) and Committee on
Children's Television, Inc. v. GeneralFoods Corp., 673 P.2d 660, 675-76 (Cal. 1983). See generally RONALD DWORKrN, LAW'S EMPIRE 200 (1986):
A commercial partnership or joint enterprise, conceived as a fraternal association, is
in that way different from even a long-standing contractual relationship. The former
has a life of its own: each partner is concerned not just to keep explicit agreements
hammered out at arm's length but to approach each issue that arises in their joint
commercial life in a manner reflecting special concern for his partner as partner.
Different forms of association presuppose different kinds of general concern each
member is assumed to have for others.
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ies.
III. A SHORT STORY ABOUT TWO LAWYERS
Alethia and Agatha founded a sporting goods company ("AA Corporation") in Belmont, Massachusetts in 1978. Working shoulder to
shoulder together over the years, they have shared the losses and the
profits, and many of the headaches and small triumphs. They built the
business up to the point where by early 1998 it operated eight branches
in the greater Boston area and had developed an acute need for additional financing for expansion.
Throughout the life of the business and until recently, Alethia and
Agatha worked closely with Arthur Attorney, a partner in a mid-sized
Boston firm who specialized in corporate and securities law. Arthur did
the legal work involved in organizing the business back in 1978, and
thereafter assisted them repeatedly, especially in matters concerning financing and labor relations. He also sat on the company's board of directors.
In January of 1998, Alethia and Agatha approached Arthur and described the company's need for major financing during the succeeding
few months. For the greater part of an afternoon, the three discussed
the range of possibilities: debt versus equity financings, bank borrowings, private placements, public offerings. No firm decisions were
reached, but the three arranged to meet regularly during the succeeding
three weeks and pursue the project.
During the first several business days after this meeting, Arthur discussed AA Corporation's interest in financing with several of his partners and with some of his acquaintances in the venture capital world. In
many of these discussions, he portrayed the personal side of AA Corporation-the relationship between Alethia and Agatha and certain aspects of the corporate culture-looking for a financing possibility that
would fit in well with that sort of business. He kept in close touch with
Alethia and Agatha as possibilities developed. Regrettably, because of
unsettling developments in his physical condition, he also found himself
during this period obliged to keep in closer and closer touch with his
cardiologist. In March he suffered a massive coronary and passed away.
Roger, a young man with an "of counsel" relationship with Arthur,
had worked from time to time on AA Corporation matters and had
from time to time accompanied Arthur to meetings with Alethia and
Agatha. Upon Arthur's death, he told Alethia and Agatha, "I will take
up the question of finding financing."
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Roger has always had a very different style of lawyering from that of
Arthur, and makes it a measure of his success to close as many deals as
possible each year. After "touching base" briefly with Alethia and
Agatha in a conference telephone call, Roger forwarded the AA Corporation financials and prospectus to Venture Investors, an aggressive venture capital limited partnership based in Wellesley, Massachusetts with
which Roger had often worked in the past. Venture Investors submits a
plan under which it would invest ten million dollars in AA Corporation
in exchange for a new class of AA Corporation preferred stock. This
plan would give Venture Investors two seats on the board of directors,
set ambitious growth targets for AA Corporation earnings, and provide
for generous conversion rights under which Alethia and Agatha would
likely forfeit control of the company to Venture if earnings did not meet
or exceed expectations.
Meanwhile, Alethia and Agatha are rethinking the structures and directions of AA Corporation. After several informal meetings in the
company conference room at which some of the store managers and directors and other "friends of the business" are present, they circulate a
draft "AA Corporation Mission Statement" which emphasizes collegiality, a "deeper commitment than can be found in most businesses to the
well-being of managers and employees" and "a deeper employee loyalty
and devotion to excellence in customer service than is prevalent in the
industry."
Alethia and Agatha send a copy of this document to Roger, who
does not read it. Alethia and Agatha invite Roger to some of the drafting meetings, but he tells them "my job is to do what you hired me for,
get the financing." Alethia and Agatha tell Roger they are not sure they
understand what the ramifications of the preferred stock provisions may
be for the future of the business, but he tells them, "you'll understand
the ten million dollars when you get it." AA Corporation completes the
preferred stock financing in May in the amount and with the terms described above.
During the autumn of 1998, serious disagreements emerge on the
board of directors about the direction and pace of expansion of AA
Corporation and also over various personnel matters. Venture Investors presses for the replacement of three store managers, and in addition
seek to remove Agatha from her position. In October, Alethia and
Agatha seek a meeting with Roger for advice in connection with these
disputes, but Roger tells them, "I am basically a deal lawyer. Get someone else."
Alethia and Agatha say that Arthur would never have allowed
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things to get to such a pass. They and AA Corporation bring a lawsuit
against Roger alleging that he has violated his duties of zealous representation and loyalty.
As this Article progresses, it will refer to this lawsuit from time to
time. A purist about contractualism could not find much to blame

Roger for. But surely Alethia and Agatha are right to be unhappy, and
only fiduciary law and morality of a sort unknown to the contractualists
explains why.
IV.

WHAT IS THE CONTRACTUALIST THESIS?

A. Some GeneralStatements of the ContractualistThesis

Judge Easterbrook and Professor Fischel state: "[T]he fiduciary
principle is fundamentally a standard term in a contract."38 "Fiduciary
duties are not special duties; they have no moral footing; they are the

same sort of obligations, derived and enforced in the same way, as other
contractual undertakings."39 The objective of fiduciary law is the same
as that of contract law, they say: namely, to "promote the parties' own
perception of their joint welfare."4 Judge Posner agrees."
Puzzlingly, Judge Easterbrook has also stated that "parties to a contract are not each others' fiduciaries" 2 and Judge Posner has stated:

Contract law does not require parties to behave altruistically toward each other; it does not proceed on the philosophy that I am
my brother's keeper. That philosophy may animate the law of
fiduciary obligations but parties to a contract are not each other's
fiduciaries...."

38. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91
YALE L.J. 698,702 (1982) [hereinafter CorporateControl].
39. Easterbrook & Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, supra note 2, at 427. See
FRANK H.

EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R.

FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF

CORPORATE LAW 34, 92 (1991) for a similar analysis of the duties of corporate managers.
40. Id. at 429. Further relevant language from this article is quoted in supra note 2.
41. See Jordan v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429, 446-47 (7th Cir. 1987) (Posner, J.,
dissenting) (implicitly approving Judge Easterbrook's statement that "[f]iduciary duties are
not special duties").
42. Kham & Nate's Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank, 908 F.2d 1351, 1357 (7th Cir. 1990).
43. Original Great Am. Chocolate Chip Cookie Co. v. River Valley Cookies, Ltd., 970
F.2d 273, 280 (7th Cir. 1992). See also Burdett v. Miller, 957 F.2d 1375, 1381 (7th Cir. 1992)
(Posner, J.) ("A fiduciary duty is the duty of an agent to treat his principal with the utmost
candor, rectitude, care, loyalty, and good faith-in fact to treat the principal as well as the
agent would treat himself.").
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B. A Longer and HarderLook at the ContractualistThesis

1. The Contractualists Narrowly Focus on "Duties," Neglecting Their
Context

After all, a rule about fiduciary duty is embedded in a history, a future, and a wider present. What Arthur or Roger is expected to do for
Alethia and Agatha emerges from a formation process in which the fiduciary relationship is created; it is embedded in doctrines about how
those expectations can be amended or terminated; it serves the purposes
for which the relationship exists; and it is embedded in a set of practices
and understandings about lawyers, about trust, and about fairness and
justice which are instantiated in the social order as a whole. The "location" and meaning of Arthur's relationship with AA Corporation differs
thoroughly from the relationship which a shoe manufacturer might have
with that company.
Although the contractualists focus in a rather Kantian way on rules,
the principles underlying contractualist thought seem to implicate all aspects of the fiduciary relationship. This Article will avert from time to
time to the wider picture.
2. The Contractualists Mean More than to Draw a Helpful Analogy
Contractualists could mean only to point out some similarities. Most
fiduciary duties arise, like contract duties, as a part of a relationship.
Like contractual relationships, fiduciary relationships are shaped and
perpetuated partly by the parties' actions, statements, interests, and
purposes. Contract law and fiduciary law both employ the concepts of
good faith, waiver, and reliance. Contract analysis and fiduciary discourse have something to learn from one another. But the contractualists plainly intend to go far beyond the drawing of helpful comparisons.
3. They Mean Either to Explain Fiduciary Law as It Is or to Reform It
The contractualists could mean to be descriptive-to have a better
way of explaining fiduciary law as it actually is. This seems to be implied by Judge Easterbrook and Professor Fischel when they state, "we
seek knowledge of when fiduciary duties arise and what form they take,
not a theory of rhetoric-a theory of what judges do, not of explanations
they give. [The objection] that the contractual perspective cannot explain the structure of legal rules.., is compelling if true."44 If this is
44. Easterbrook & Fischel, Contractand FiduciaryDuty, supra note 2, at 429.
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their thesis, the contractualists are not trying to change the law.'
Alternatively, the contractualists could mean to be prescriptive-to
offer a program for the reform of fiduciary law. This seems to be the
implication of the statement by Judge Easterbrook and Professor Fischel that the law of fiduciaries has "no moral basis." The prescriptive
project would involve replacing the principles of fiduciary thought with
contract principles and its doctrines with ones consistent with contract
theory.
This Article takes up first the descriptive approach and then the prescriptive one.
V. PRIMITIVE DESCRIPTIVE CONTRACTUALISM: IS FIDUCIARY LAW
REALLY BLACK-LETTER CONTRACT LAW?

First, consider a primitive version of descriptive contractualism. (A
more complex version will be introduced in the next Section.) Are fiduciary duties "standard term[s] in... contract[s] 46 "derived and enforced
' in a simple, obviin the same way, as other contractual undertakings"47
ous sense, so that, for example, the merits of Alethia's and Agatha's
claims against Roger could be established on the basis of the rules of
contract law we now have on the books?
Put on the robes of a primitive contractualist judge---call him Justice
Hornbook. He is "primitive" because he limits his work to looking
things up in hornbooks and treatises. He is "contractualist" because he
limits himself to the black-letter contracts law which he finds in hornbooks and treatises. If the primitive contractualist view is right, even
Justice Hornbook would recognize fiduciary duties, to just the extent
real judges do but using a different vocabulary. If the primitive contractualist view is right, Justice Hornbook would be favorably impressed by
Alethia's and Agatha's case, since although real judges would look at it
as primarily fiduciary in nature he could find full reason for granting relief on contract grounds. But in fact, as this Article here goes on to
demonstrate, Justice Hornbook would readily conclude that their case is
a weak one.

45. Indeed, some of their judicial decisions go on referring to standard fiduciary duties
as though little needs to change. See, e.g., In re Marchiando v. Illinois, 13 F.3d 1111, 1116 (7th
Cir. 1994) (Posner, C.J.) (referring to the fiduciary status of lawyers, corporate directors, and
managing partners without relying on contract law). Judge Posner does not cite Judge
Easterbrook's and Professor Fischel's 1993 article referred to in supra note 2.
46. Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate Control,supra note 38, at 702.
47. Easterbrook & Fischel, Contractand FiduciaryDuty, supra note 2, at 427.
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A. Formationof the Relationship
First of all, he doubts that Alethia and Agatha ever entered into any
binding arrangement with Roger. Where was the offer? "I will take up
the question of finding financing" is too vague.4s Where was the acceptance? Contract law only hesitantly recognizes silence as acceptance.49
Where were the terms spelled out? When the parties' expressions of
agreement are scant, courts may refuse to recognize a contract.' Fiduciary law is readier to recognize a binding relationship than is contract
law ' Fiduciary law would likely accept that a binding fiduciary relationship arose with Roger 5 2 but contract law probably would not.
Could Alethia and Agatha rely on a theory of implied contract to
48. See generally Southworth v. Oliver, 587 P.2d 994 (Or. 1978) (noting that indefiniteness in a communication tends to support the conclusion that it is not an offer);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 33 (1981) ("Even though a manifestation of intention is intended to be understood as an offer, it cannot be accepted so as to form a contract
unless the terms of the contract are reasonably certain."); 1 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH,
FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS 213 (1990).
49. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 48, at 234. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 69 (1981).
50. See Jennison v. Jennison, 499 A.2d 302 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (refusing specific performance of an agreement to sell stock because the price had not been agreed upon). In
Moore v. Dilworth, 179 S.W.2d 940 (Tex. 1944), the court said:
It is essential to the validity of a contract that it be sufficiently certain to define the
nature and extent of its obligations. If an agreement is so indefinite as to make it
impossible for a court to fix the legal liability of the parties thereto, it cannot constitute an enforceable contract.
Id at 942. But many judges try hard to avoid a finding of unenforceability because of vagueness. See, e.g., In re Gulf Oil/Cities Service Tender Offer Litigation, 725 F. Supp. 712,739-40
(S.D.N.Y. 1989) (holding that the term "material" was not so vague as to render the contract
unenforceable); Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil, Co., 729 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 33 (1981); FARNSWORTH, supra note 48, at §§
3.27-329.
51. See Dexter & Carpenter, Inc. v. Houston, 20 F.2d 647, 652 (4th Cir. 1927) (holding
that the fiduciary obligation of joint venturers "begins with the opening of the negotiations
for the formation of the syndicate"). See generally Hyman v. Regenstein, 222 F.2d 545 (5th
Cir. 1955); Appleman v. Kansas-Nebraska Natural Gas Co., 217 F.2d 843 (10th Cir. 1954).
Each of these cases holds that the relationship of joint venturers can be inferred from conduct
and need not be founded on express agreement. A recent partnership decision states, "The
rule generally accepted... imposes a fiduciary duty not only with respect to transactions occurring during the partnership but also with respect to 'those taking place during negotiations
leading to the formation of the partnership."' Waite v. Sylvester, 560 A.2d 619, 625 (N.H.
1989) (dictum) (citation omitted).
52. Cf DeVaux v. American Home Assurance Co., 444 N.E.2d 355 (Mass. 1983) (holding that an attorney might be liable for malpractice despite absence of a clear acceptance by
him of an attorney-client relationship).
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avoid these difficulties? Implied contract law is described this way by
Judge Posner:
A doctor chances on a stranger lying unconscious on the street,
treats him, and later demands a fee. Has he a claim? The law's
answer is yes. The older legal terminology spoke of an implied
contract between the physician and the stranger for medical assistance. This idea has been attacked as a fiction, and modem
writers prefer to base the physician's legal rights on the principle
of unjust enrichment. This term smacks of morality, but the
cases are better explained in economic terms, and the concept of
an implied contract is a useful shorthand ....
In the case of the doctor the costs of a voluntary transaction
would be prohibitive. The cause of high transaction costs in that
case is incapacity; in other cases it might be time (e.g., the
stranger is conscious but bleeding profusely and there is no time
to discuss the terms). In such cases, the law considers whether,
had transaction costs not been prohibitive, the parties would
have come to terms and if so what (approximately) the terms
would have been. If a court can be reasonably confident both
that there would have been a transaction and what its essential
terms would have been[,] ... it does not hesitate to write a contract between the parties after the fact. 3
This doctor possesses the law professor's standard example of a
strong claim under a contract implied in law. But Alethia's and
Agatha's claim, like the claims of most people seeking to vindicate fiduciary rights, seems much weaker. He has acted when acceptance was
impossible; they had every opportunity for further communication. His
situation involved a threat to life and physical safety; theirs did not. He
conferred benefits; they are seeking them. Their case might be compared to that of an accident victim who wakes up and demands that the
physician perform a checkup and afford a full range of medical services.
(And, finally, it may be noted that insofar as such physician cases can be
53. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 4, at 133-34. See David Charny, HypotheticalBargains: The Normative Structure of ContractInterpretation,89 MICH. L. REV. 1815
(1991); Robert A. Long, Jr., Note, A Theory of Hypothetical Contract,94 YALE L. J. 415,41516 (1984) ("[A] court should impose a hypothetical contract if two conditions are met: (1)
high transaction cost precluded an express contract; and (2) imposing a hypothetical contract
results in a Pareto-superior transaction.") (citations omitted). See generally RICHARD A.
POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE (1981).
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helpful at all to Alethia and Agatha it is in part because physicians may
resemble fiduciaries-under some authorities they are fiduciaries-so
that cases about them are not pure contracts cases.)
B. Duties Entailedin the Relationship
Suppose there was a contract: Did Roger violate it? Alethia and
Agatha can persuade him that a binding relationship had formed up,
Justice Hornbook doubts that it imposed on Roger any duties to act
other than as he did.
What has he done wrong? Alethia and Agatha, as described above,
complain that Roger did not loyally and zealously represent them because he presented them with a financing arrangement which contravened their purposes and because he failed to discuss the implications of
the preferred stock charter provisions. But Justice Hornbook can locate
nothing in the communications between the parties that required Roger
to act differently. Alethia and Agatha complain that Roger ditched
them after the financing rather than staying on and helping them further, but as near as Justice Hornbook can discern, Roger's "job description" was more or less what he says it was. Roger ignored the mission
statement, the new directions for AA Corporation and the like, but Justice Hornbook does not see why these developments are relevant, as
they emerged after the formation of the contract and do not form a part
of an amendment.-4
Alethia's and Agatha's difficulties will impede many fiduciary lawsuits in Justice Hornbook's court. Fiduciary duties are often not set
forth-sometimes not even referred to-in agreements between the parties. Seldom does a contract between an attorney and his client specify
the duty to avoid conflicts of interest; seldom does a trustee promise to
be zealous in his dealings with the trust.
1. Fiduciary Duties as Plugs in Contractual Gaps?
Could Alethia and Agatha persuade Justice Hornbook to derive fi54. Works on relational contracts include Stewart Macaulay, An Empirical View of
Contract 1985 WIs. L. REV. 465; Ian R. Macneil, Relational Contract- What We Do and Do

Not Know, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 483; Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts,67 VA. L. REV. 1089 (1981); Ian R. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of LongTerm Economic Relations Under Classica4 Neoclassica and Relational ContractLaw, 72 NW.
U. L. REV. 854 (1978); Stewart Macaulay, Non-ContractualRelations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55 (1963); Randy E. Barnett, ConflictingVisions: A Critiqueof
Ian Macneil's Relational Theory of Contract,78 VA. L. REV. 1175 (1992); Peter Linzer, Uncontracts: Context, Contorts, andthe RelationalApproach, 1988 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 139.
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duciary duties from the part of contract law which tells how to fill the
gaps in agreements? Judge Easterbrook and Professor Fischel suggest
such an approach: "[T]he law is designed to promote the parties own
perception of their joint welfare. That objective calls for filling gaps in
fiduciary relations the same way courts fill gaps in other contracts. The
subject matter may differ, but the objective and therefore the process is
identical."5
But this approach will not suffice, for several reasons. First, courts
fill gaps parsimoniously, recognizing implicit terms only when they are
fairly specific and close neighbors to the explicit ones. Second, courts do
not usually fill gaps with duties of the broader sort familiar to the trustee, the attorney, the partner, and the other fiduciaries. Consider the
case of Bentley v. State,56 discussed by Judge Posner in his book Economic Analysis of Law:
The State of Wisconsin once hired a man named Bentley to
build wings on the state capitol under the direction of the state's
architect. Bentley followed the architect's 'lans faithfully, but
they were no good, and the wings collapsed shortly after being
completed." The state sued Bentley,59 allegng that he had guaranteed his work against such a calamity.
The contract said
nothing germane on the subject; obviously neither party had
thought it likely that the wings would collapse because the architect's plans were bad. The state lost its suit. This is the right
economic result. The state could have prevented the calamity at
lower cost than Bentley, by more careful selection or supervision
of the architect.61
The analysis would have been quite different had Bentley been a lawyer
for the state after the collapse of a badly constructed loan transaction.
Even though officials in the office of the state treasurer might have

55.
56.
57.
at 339.
58.

Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 2, at 429.
41 N.W. 338 (Wis. 1889).
Actually only one of the wings was alleged to have collapsed. See Bentley, 41 N.W.
Actually, the collapse was alleged to have occurred shortly before completion. See

id.
59. The lawsuit was actually brought by Bentley against the state. See iL
60. Actually, the state's defense was not that Bentley guaranteed anything; it was that
Bentley had been paid the full contract amount and had no sufficient basis in the contract to
claim more even though he had been put to extra work to restore the collapsed wing.
61. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 4, at 94 (citation omitted).
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acted as the "architects" of the loan transaction, courts would hold the
lawyer to a standard of diligence, care, and zeal high enough to require
him to do substantial analysis and checking of his own.62
Courts usually fill gaps by looking hard at the facts of the transaction
before them rather than proceeding "generically." But fiduciary law
usually takes a generic approach, insisting that all trustees, attorneys,
and so on are subject to a standard panoply of duties.
When courts do look beyond the specifics of the deal at issue to consider comparable transactions, they ask on what sorts of terms parties
generally agree. But contracting parties seldom agree on wide open,
"litigation-breeder" duties."3 They rarely include language mirroring the
standard fiduciary duties such as those of "loyalty," "zeal," and the
avoidance of conflicts of interest. Contracting parties tend to aim for
rules rather than principles.'M Courts accordingly aim, as Farnsworth
recommends, at "certainty and practicability" in devising gap-filling
rules. ' The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has stated: "It would obviously be quite unreasonable and wholly undesirable to imply an obligation that would necessarily be vague, uncertain and generally impracticable." 66
In any event, courts do not fill gaps unless there are gaps. In some
standard fiduciary situations there are none. Some fiduciary relationships-those in venture capital partnerships, for example-are accompanied by full-blown contracts that are pretty much free of gaps: the
trust indentures under which bonds are issued are pretty much free even
of microscopic apertures. But these comprehensive agreements rarely
include clauses identifying one of the parties as a fiduciary or echoing
the duties characteristic of the fiduciary relationship.

62. See FITZGIBBON AND GLAZER ON LEGAL OPINIONS: WHAT OPINIONS IN
FINANCIAL TRANSACrIONS SAY AND WHAT THEY MEAN, chs. 4 & 5 (1992) (describing the
responsibilities of lawyers to conduct an investigation and analysis on their own in a business
transaction, above and beyond what they may be told by officers of their client corporation or
by other lawyers working on the matter).
63. For a discussion of the expenses of "monitoring and bonding mechanisms," see
Daniel R. Fischel, The Economics of Lender Liability, 99 YALE L.J. 131 (1989).
64. A generic approach to gap-filling might be defended on utility grounds. It makes
prediction easier by parties inclined to save time in bargaining. See Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Default Rules for Commercial Contracts, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 597, 606-08
(1990). Further discussion of economic analysis of gap-filling is included infra at Part VI.C.
65. E.ALLAN FARNSvORTH, CONTRACTS 501 (3d ed. 1999).
66. Dickey v. Philadelphia Minit-Man Corp., 105 A.2d 580, 582 (1954) (refusing to supply a term which would have required tenant to continue to engage in the business of car
cleaning even though the rent was calculated in part on the profits of that business).
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A fortiori courts do not fill gaps with provisions that conflict with express terms in the agreement." Fiduciary duties, however, are sometimes imposed in the teeth of express terms to the contrary. For example, the lawyer's duty to avoid certain conflicts of interest applies
notwithstanding client consent to the conflict,69 and the corporate direc-

tor is7 0subject to certain duties of loyalty which cannot be contracted
away.

2. Fiduciary Duties as Protections for the Vulnerable?
Could Alethia and Agatha persuade Justice Hornbook to derive fi-

duciary duties from some part of contract law which applies where one
party is especially vulnerable to abuse by the other?7 ' Fiduciary beneficiaries often are. Wards suffer from incapacity; clients, patients, corporate shareholders and the customers of securities brokers suffer from
inexpertise; beneficiaries of broadly-worded trusts would suffer, were it
not for fiduciary law, from an inability to pin down their trustees to specific obligations. Judge Posner seems to embrace a vulnerability theory
when he writes:

The common law imposes [a fiduciary] duty when the disparity
between the parties in knowledge or power relevant to the performance of an undertaking is so vast that it is a reasonable inference that had the parties in advance negotiated expressly over
the issue they would have agreed that the agent owed the principal the high duty that we have described, because otherwise the

principal would be placing himself at the agent's mercy. An ex-

67. "[A]ny term that a court would supply can be derogated from by agreement of the
parties, either explicitly or by necessary inference. Such terms are therefore suppletory rather
than mandatory." 2 FARNSWORTH, supra note 48, at § 7.16 (citation omitted).
68. This mandatory aspect of some fiduciary doctrines is discussed generally in Brudney,
Contractand Fiduciary,supra note 2; Brudney, Corporate Governance,supra note 2, Frankel,
FiduciaryDuties,supra note 2, at 1242-51.
69. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 5 (1972).
70. See Tupper v. Kroc, 494 P.2d 1275 (Nev. 1972); Weidner, supra note 14, at 453-61.
71. Professor Frankel accounts for fiduciary duties based on the vulnerability of beneficiaries, but does not make them out to be contractual---"fiduciary relations are not necessarily contractual." Frankel, FiduciaryLaw, supra note 20, at 813. Another article noting vulnerabilities as a basis for fiduciary law but not accounting for them as contractual is Robert
Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, The Fiduciary Relationship: Its Economic Characterand Legal Consequences,66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045 (1991).
72. See Brudney, Corporate Governance,supra note 2, at 1411 ("[I]nvestors in general
cannot, and do not, freely and knowingly choose, or indeed comprehend, the terms of the
'contract' which binds management to serve them .... ").
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ample is the relation between a guardian and his minor ward, or
a lawyer and his client. The ward, the client, is in no position to
supervise or control the actions of his principal on his behalf; he
must take those actions on trust; the fiduciary principle is designed to prevent that trust from being misplaced.!
What branch of contract law does Justice Hornbook rely on here?
a. Gap Filling?

Justice Hornbook has dipped into gap-filling law once; does he reach
different conclusions if he bears in mind the vulnerabilities of certain
parties to the relationship? Could Alethia and Agatha persuade him to
fill the gaps with fiduciary duties because of their vulnerability to abuse
by Roger? Do contract-law's gap-filling standards require special results where vulnerability is present?
Consider the standards, "what sort of bargain would the parties have
struck had there not been vulnerability at the formation stage?" "What
would the parties have agreed to had they thought about the vulnerability problem then (and had both been able to bargain about it effectively)?" Or, "what devices handle the vulnerability problem with certainty and practicability"? These questions do not readily call for
answers which refer to fiduciary duties. Judge Hornbook may instead
react to vulnerability at the formation stage, if it is bad enough, by
holding the contract unconscionable and invalidating or reforming those
clauses that are unjust. 4 He may react to vulnerability during the rela73. Burdett v. Miller, 957 F.2d 1375, 1381 (7th Cir. 1992). The phrase "high duty we
have described" refers to the statement that "[a] fiduciary duty is the duty of an agent to treat
his principal with the utmost candor, rectitude, care, loyalty, and good faith-in fact to treat
the principal as well as the agent would treat himself." Id at 1381. In Pohl v. NationalBenefits Consultants,Inc., 956 F.2d 126 (7th Cir. 1992), Judge Posner, in dicta, elaborated on this
idea:
The reason for the duty is clearest when the agent has a broad discretion the exercise of which the principal cannot feasibly supervise, so that the principal is at the
agent's mercy. The agent might be the lawyer, and the principal his client; or the
agent might be an investment adviser, and the principal an orphaned child. If the
agent has no discretion and the principal has a normal capacity for self-protection,
ordinary contract principles should generally suffice.
ld. at 129.
74. See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965)
(holding that certain installment-purchase contracts including provisions for the pro-rata application of payments among items of merchandise might be unconscionable); Cutler Corp. v.
Latshaw, 97 A.2d 234 (Pa. 1954) (refusing to give effect to a confession-of-judgment clause).
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tionship under the contract by imposing on Roger standards of reasonable dealing and good faith.
b. Good Faith?

In general, the contracting party's duty of good faith75 establishes
nothing like the full panoply of fiduciary obligations.76 Judge Posner
says as much in one of his judicial opinions:
The particular confusion to which the vaguely moralistic overtones of "good faith" give rise is the belief that every contract establishes a fiduciary relationship. A fiduciary is required to treat
his principal as if the principal were he, and therefore he may not

take advantage of the principal's incapacity, ignorance, inexperience, or even naivete. .

.

. But it is unlikely that Wisconsin

wishes, in the name of good faith, to make every contract signatory his brother's keeper ....In fact the law contemplates that
people frequently will take advantage of the ignorance of those
with whom they contract, without thereby incurring liability....
[E]ven after you have signed a contract, you are not obliged to
become an altruist toward the other party.
Could Alethia and Agatha plead their vulnerability to Justice Hornbook and thereby persuade him to expand Roger's duty of good faith to
encompass fiduciary duties? There are some authorities that may help
them: authorities which emphasize a robust duty of good faith towards
employees,78 towards purchasers under output contracts, 9 and towards
sellers under requirements contracts," all of whom suffer from obvious
vulnerabilities.
75. See supra note 29.
76. See 2 FARNSWORTH, supra note 48, § 7.17A at 330 ("[T]he standard [of good faith] is
not as exacting as the standard.., applied to agents and other fiduciaries.").
77. Market St. Assoc. v. Frey, 941 F.2d 588, 593-94 (7th Cir. 1991). Easterbrook and Fischel state: "When transaction costs reach a particularly high level, some persons start calling
some contractual relations 'fiduciary,' but this should not mask the continuum. Contract law
includes a principle of good faith .... Good faith in contract merges into fiduciary duties,
with a blur and not a line." Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 2, at 438. Their point is that
fiduciary duties are further out along the continuum. See also id. at 438 n.28 (noting that fiduciary duties are duties not just of good faith but of utmost good faith).
78. See 2 FARNSWORTH, supra note 48, §7.17 at 320-37.
79. See i. at 312. See U.C.C. § 2-306(1) (1997) ("A term which measures the quantity
by the output of the seller or the requirements of the buyer means such actual output or requirements as may occur in good faith ....
").
80. See Homestake Mining Co. v. Washington Pub. Power Supply Sys., 476 F. Supp. 1162
(N.D. Cal. 1979), affd, 652 F.2d 28 (9th Cir. 1981); U.C.C. § 2-306(1), quoted in supra note 79.
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But there is a limit to such expansion. Some authorities indicate that
the duty of good faith is mostly about honesty: telling the truth in full
and acting according to the fair implications of promises." On this view
good faith can expand naturally to encompass disclosure-related fiduciary duties,2 but not others.
Other authorities indicate that the duty of good faith is mostly about
keeping implicit as well as express promises. Judge Posner embraces
this view:
The concept of the duty of good faith like the concept of fiduciary duty is a stab at approximating the terms the parties would
have negotiated had they foreseen the circumstances that have
given rise to their dispute.... We could of course do without the
term "good faith," and maybe even without the doctrine. We
could... speak instead of implied conditions .... But whether
we say that a contract shall be deemed to contain such implied
conditions as are necessary to make sense of the contract, or that
a contract obligates the parties to cooperate in its performance in
"good faith" to the extent necessary to carry out the purposes of
the contract, comes to much the same thing. They are different
ways of formulating the overriding purpose of contract law,
which is to give the parties what they would have stipulated for
expressly if at the time of making the contract they had had complete knowledge of the future and the costs of negotiating and
adding provisions to the contract had been zero. "
On this view, good faith goes only so far as the implied terms; the limits
on implication of terms as an explanation of fiduciary duties have been
discussed above.
c. The Inadequacy of Any Vulnerability-BasedTheory
Vulnerability-based doctrines have a limited goal: to bring the vulnerable party up to where he would have been had he not been vulnerable. Vulnerability theories, therefore, may explain those aspects of fiduciary law which are tort-like and harm-avoiding in nature: nonvulnerable parties protect themselves from harm. Harm-prevention
81. See U.C.C. § 1-201(19) (1997) ("'Good faith' means honesty in fact in the conduct or
transaction concerned.").
82. But perhaps not all: "The duty of... good faith even expansively conceived, is not a
duty of candor." Market St. Assoc. v. Frey, 941 F.2d 588,594 (7th Cir. 1991) (Posner, J.).

83. Id at 595-96.
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theories justify, for example, doctrines prohibiting a corporate director
from competing with his corporation and from taking corporate opportunities in which it has an interest or expectancy: actions like these
harm the shareholders.
Vulnerability theories may also explain those aspects of fiduciary
law which forbid the fiduciary to hog more than a fair share of the
profit. Non-vulnerable parties make sure they get their fair share. An
anti-hogging vulnerability theory can explain, for example, the duty of a
corporate director to be fair in interested transactions and to cause the
corporation to issue shares only for a fair price.
What vulnerability theories cannot do is explain the generous, zealrequiring, benefit-conferring aspects of the fiduciary relationship. For
example, vulnerability theories cannot explain the duty of a corporate
director vigorously to enhance the profits of his corporation. They cannot explain the prominent "line of business" version of the corporate
opportunity doctrine, which requires the director to give over to his corporation opportunities in which it has no "tangible interest or expectancy." Some of fiduciary law aims to give beneficiaries more than what
even the most robust party would secure by contract.
C. Conclusion
Justice Hornbook ends up dismissing Alethia's and Agatha's lawsuit
against Roger. The fiduciary relationship which establishes their claim
is considerably "bigger" and more demanding than anything known to
black-letter contract law.
VI. ADVANCED DESCRIPTIVE CONTRACTUALISM: IS FIDUCIARY

LAW BASED ON CONTRACT ETHICS AND POLICIES?

What, then, of the thesis that fiduciary duties are "standard term[s]
in contract[s]" ' "derived and enforced in the same way, as other contractual undertakings"?s It is not accurate according to Justice Hornbook's analysis; will it be found compelling upon deeper reflection?
Put on the robes, now, of a different sort of judge, Justice Jurisprudence, who adjudicates fiduciary situations by applying not contract doctrines but contract theory: the purposes, policies, principles-the ethics--of contract.

84. Easterbrook & Fischel, CorporateContro4 supra note 38, at 703.
85. Easterbrook & Fischel, Contractand FiduciaryDuty, supra note 2, at 423.
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A. What is the Ethics and Anthropology UnderlyingContractualism?
Here is a central passage from Easterbrook and Fischel:
What do terms such as "duty of loyalty" mean? Because the
process is contractual-because both principal and agent enter
this understanding for gain-the details should be those that
maximize that gain, which the contracting parties can divide.
Ever since Roger Coase published The Problem of Social Cost, it
has been understood that legal rules can promote the benefits of
contractual endeavors in a world of scarce information and high
transactions costs by prescribing the outcomes the parties themselves would have reached had information been plentiful and
negotiations costless.... With powers hedged in by competition
and the price system, judges must choose between promoting the
parties' contracting (and thus increasing both private and social
wealth) and frustrating it (injuring the parties and society). That
is not a hard choice. Providing, as a public service, the rules the
parties themselves would have chosen in a transaction-cost-free
world fosters instrumental and ethical objectives at the same
time.... So... a "fiduciary" relation is a contractual one ..... 6
Let us uncover the elements underlying this argument.
1. Utilitarian Ethics
Utilitarianism in some form underlies economic analysis of the law,
including in the works of Judge PosnerY In its classic form, utilitarian86. Id., at 426-27 (citations omitted). The quoted passage ends with the phrase, "characterized by unusually high costs of specification and monitoring."
87. See POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 4, which appears at some points to
embrace a pleasure-based version of utilitarianism. The prescriptive aspect of the book is
based on maximizing efficiency. See, eg., id. at 23. "Efficiency" is defined as "that allocation
of resources in which value is maximized." Id. at 13. "[Value" is "measured by willingness
to pay." Id. What makes people willing to pay? The answer looks to their "satisfactions":
economics assumes "that man is a rational maximizer of his ends in life, his satisfactions." Id.
at 3. The term "satisfactions" appears to refer to experiences, feeling, and pleasant feelings,
suggesting an interchangeability among such concepts. See id. at 15-16, 264 for other passages
tying efficiency to utilitarianism. But see id. at 13:
Suppose that pituitary extract is in very scarce supply relative to the demand and is
therefore very expensive. A poor family has a child who will be a dwarf if he does
not get some of the extract, but the family cannot afford the price .... A rich family
has a child who will grow to normal height, but the extract will add a few inches
more, and his parents decide to buy it for him. In the sense of value used in this
book, the pituitary extract is more valuable to the rich than to the poor family, be-
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ism is
[t]he creed which accepts as the foundation of morals "utility" or
the "greatest happiness principle" ....[It] holds that actions are
right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness; wrong as
they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is
intended pleasure and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain
and the privation of pleasure."
Different definitions of "utility" can be constructed which leave out
the experiential element and refer only to "preferences" or "choices."8 9
Economists sometimes speak this way without meaning to embrace any
theory of ethics; they aim merely to relate choices and preferences to
supply, price, or some other factor. But when economists go beyond
prediction to recommend changes in the law, they are committed to advancing some theory of the good. So there is a theory of ethics which
takes a similar form. John Harsanyi, for example, states that we should:
follow the economists in defining social utility in terms of the
preferences... of the individual members of society.... [W]e
should help [other people] to obtain pleasure or to avoid pain, or
to attain "mental states of intrinsic worth," or to achieve any
other objective, only as far as they want to achieve it.'
cause value is measured by willingness to pay; but the extract would confer greater
happiness in the hands of the poor family than in the hands of the rich one.
So it is utilitarianism with a bias towards the rich. See generally Note, Judge Richard Posner's
Wealth Maximization Principle: Another Form of Utilitarianism?,10 CARDOZO L. REV. 875
(1989). Compare Richard A. Posner, Wealth Maximization Revisited, 2 NOTRE DAME J. L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 85 (1985).
88. JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM 18 (Samuel Gorovitz ed., 1971) (1863). This
Article throughout deals with utilitarianism in its "act-utilitarian" version; the alternative"rule utilitarianism"-leads to impossible difficulties when it comes to identifying the relevant
rule. See generally John C. Harsanyi, Rule Utilitarianism and Decision Theory, 11
ERKENNTNIS 25 (1977) [hereinafter Rule Utilitarianism].
89. Similarly, terms like "satisfaction" and "welfare" can be defined this way.
90. Harsanyi, Rule Utilitarianism,supra note 88, at 27-28. See JOHN C. HARSANYI,
ESSAYS ON ETHICS, SOCIAL BEHAVIOR, AND SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION (1976); John C.
Harsanyi, Does Reason Tell Us What Moral Code to Follow, and, Indeed, to Follow Any
Moral Code at All?, 96 ETHICS 42 (1985) (advocating preference-based rule utilitarianism);
John C. Harsanyi, Morality and the Theory of Rational Behaviour,in UTILITARIANISM AND
BEYOND 39,54-56 (Amartya Sen & Bernard Williams eds., 1982); John C. Harsanyi, Ethics in
Terms of Hypothetical Imperatives, 47 MIND 305 (1958). Other discussions of such ethical
theories include DAVID GAUTHIER, MORALS BY AGREEMENT (1986); Richard A. Epstein,
Postscript: Subjective Utilitarianism,12 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 769 (1989) (embracing
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Professor Harsanyi calls his version "Preference Utilitarianism." 9'
2. Utilitarian Anthropology: Man as a Rational Utility Seeker9
Many writers in the utilitarian tradition embrace not only an account
of the good but also an account of the person; not only an ethic but also
an anthropology: They describe a utilitarian or economic person. He is
out for himself; he is interested in other people insofar as they can benefit Number One.93 As George Stigler says: "[W]e live in a world of reasonable well-informed people acting intelligently in pursuit of their selfinterests." ' 4 Amartya Sen states: "In the usual economic literature a
person is seen as maximizing his utility function, which determines all
his choices." 5
Classic writers describe him as "out for himself" in the sense of "out
to satisfy his appetites"; but as with ethics, so with anthropology: In recent decades economists have attempted to develop a theory which is
"bleached" of appetites and of almost all psychological content.96 A
"canonical formulation" by Professor Sen indicates that
"we assume that each player's objective is to maximize the expected value of his own payoff, which is measured in some utility
scale." The payoff function is a real-valued representation of the
person's preferences over the outcomes. Rationality is seen as
intelligently maximizing such a payoff function, using all the
available instruments, subject to feasibility."
preference utilitarianism as a "maxim of political behavior"). See generally Robin L. West,
Taking Preferences Seriously, 64 TUL. L. REv. 659, 683-85 (1990). Preference-based and
similar theories are described and criticized in RICHARD B. BRANDT, MORALITY,
UTILITARIANISM AND RIGHTS ch. 9 (1992) and Mark Carl Overvold, Self-Interest and Getting What You Want, in THE LIMITS OF UTILITARIANISM 86 (Harlan B. Miller & William H.
Williams eds., 1982).
91. Harsanyi, Rule Utilitarianism,supra note 88, at 27.
92. Another feature of anthropology is an emphasis on the will. See generally VERNON
J. BOURKE, WILL IN WESTERN THOUGHT: AN HISTORICO-CRITICAL SURVEY (1964). The
implications of emphasis on the will for contract thought are discussed in infra note 105.
93. For a general discussion of these issues, see L.D. Broad, Egoism as a Theory of Human Motives, in PROBLEMS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 111-18 (Paul W. Taylor ed., 1978).
94. George Stigler, Economics or Ethics?, in 2 TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN
VALUES, 143,190 (Sterling M. McMurrin ed., 1981).
95. AMARTYA SEN, ON ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 80

(1987).

96. As described in Martin Hollis & Robert Sugden, Rationality in Action, 102 MIND 1,

5-7 (1993).
97. Amartya Sen, The Formulation of Rational Choice, 84 AM. Ec. REV. 385 (1994)
(quoting R. MYERSON, GAME THEORY 2 (1991)).
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This anthropology describes a man who is "rational" in the sense of internal consistency; the theory does not specify what goal he consistently
pursues."

B. What These Ethical andAnthropologicalDoctrines Tell Us About
Affiliations
The ethics tells us that affiliations are good insofar as they enhance utility. The anthropology tells us that people affiliate each for his
own utility. Putting the ethics and the anthropology together leads to
the conclusion that where conditions are conducive to each party's pursuit of his purposes and when under those conditions the parties elect to
affiliate, the affiliation is good.99

A relationship of friendship of kinship may enhance utility; and a
transfer of goods or services within such a relationship-an anniversary
present; a helping hand in time of trouble-may contribute to this good.
The gift or service enhances not only the utility of the donee, but also
that of the donor because of the phenomenon of "interdependent utilities." ' The donor is better off because he takes pleasure in the pleasures of the friend, or because the satisfactions of the friend are high on
his preference scale. Where his utilities are interdependent, one party
looks out for the interests of both.
A relationship where there are no interdependent utilities may also
enhance utility. Sales, barters, exchanges of goods or services: these
may enhance the utility of both parties even though neither may care
much what happens to the other. A sale, we can be reasonably sure, enhances the utility of both the seller and the buyer because each looks
out for his own interests. With gifts between friends, it is something
special about the two parties and the way they have related to one another above and beyond the transfer which establishes the gift's utility;
with sales and exchanges, there need be nonsuch special personal feature-the parties may be strangers. The parties focus not on one another but on the goods, the services, and the price.
98. AMARTYA SEN, supra note 95, at 12-14. See Hollis, Rational Preferences, 14
PHILOSOPHICAL FORUM 246, 248 (1983) ("A rational agent, microeconomically speaking, is
one whose actions are well calculated, in the light of their likely consequences (and costs) best
to satisfy his existing preferences.").
99. Leaving aside effects on third parties; as to them, the Coase theorem provides a
measure of reassurance.
100. Richard A. Posner, Gratuitous Promises in Economics and Law, 6 J. LEGAL STUD.
411, 412 (1977). For markedly different views of gifts in relation to contract, see James
Gordley, Enforcing Promises, 83 CAL. L. REV. 547,570 (1995).
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This latter type of affiliation is the paradigmatic one for contractualists.
When a man possesses a certain commodity, he cannot benefit
himself by giving it away. It seems to be implied, therefore, in
the very fact of his parting with it for another commodity, that he
is benefited by what he receives. His own commodity he might
have kept, if it had been valued by him more than that for which
he exchanges it. The fact of his choosing to have the other commodity rather than his own, is proof that the other is to him more
valuable than his own.'01
And here is Judge Posner to similar effect: "Where resources are
shifted pursuant to [a voluntary transaction], we can be reasonably sure
that the shift involves an increase in efficiency."""2 Let us call this sort of
affiliation a Utility Contract.
An aggressive claim can be advanced about Utility Contracts for optimal market conditions: Here Utility Contracts not only enhance utility, they may enhance it to the maximum. When a commodity is sold in
a well functioning market, it not only goes to some user who will be better off for it; it may go to the most efficient user. The interests of the
seller lead him to demand the best price he can get. A more efficient
user will pay more than an inefficient one. Here is an advantage of the
Utility Contract over an affiliation of donation, according to this line of
thought. There is no assurance that a gift goes to a recipient who can
use it best.
C. What This Suggests For ContractLaw
All of this suggests that the guide for the law is this: "Look for a
Utility Contract and enforce it appropriately." This mandate contains
five elements:

101. JOHN STUART MILL, ELEMENTS OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 125-26 (3d ed. 1844).

Similar views appear in Jeremy Bentham, General View of A Complete Code of Laws ch.
XVI, in 3 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 155, 190 (J. Bowring ed., 1962). In preference
utilitarian analysis, the reasoning is of course different: that a party chooses to enter into an
affiliation is not "proof" of its "value" to him but an exercise of a preference.
102. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 4, at 14. In the case of preference utilitarianism, the point is of course stronger than that of expertise: each party in a sense defines
his own utility by way of formulating his preferences.
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1. Look for a Formation Process Appropriate for a Utility Contract
An appropriate process is one involving self-interested parties, as
charitable donors do not form Utility Contracts; and capacities and conditions conducive to utility calculations, because incapacity, duress, or
other circumstances which cast doubt on the occurrence of competent
utility calculations undermine the case for enforcement.
2. Look for a Firm and Final Outcome Embraced by Both Parties
The law should fix on the outcome of the utility calculations, and not
on hypotheses or preliminary determinations.O° "Both parties," not just
one, for reasons which are obvious from what has been said."° The law
should look for a moment-the "moment of formation"-when the parties concur on a firm and final set of terms.0 5
3. Take this Firm and Final Determination as the Dominant Guide to

Adjudication"'6

The law should, according to this line of analysis, give preference to
norms which trace their pedigrees to the final determination referred to
above. It should reflect the view that "contractual obligations are by
definition self-imposed.' "' (A good name for this is "positivism.").

103. For authorities relating to the question whether preliminary understandings are enforceable, see supra note 48.
104. Authorities requiring a correspondence between offer and acceptance include Langellier v. Schaefer, 31 N.W. 690 (Minn. 1887). See 1FARNSWORTH, supra note 48, at 259.
105. This approach is also supported by another aspect of anthropological thought: emphasis on the will. See generally P. S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF
CONTRACT 405 (1979) (discussing the will as a central feature of contract analysis during the
period 1770-1870); Morris A. Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REV. 553, 575
(1933) ("[T]he classic view [is that] the law of contracts gives expression to and protects the
will of the parties, for the will is something inherently worthy of respect."). The will is often
spoken of as a simple element located at a single point in time. You can speak of "developing" taste and "growing" in wisdom, but an "act" of the will or an "object" of volition. Understanding contract as a matter of the wills therefore suggests understanding contract formation as the event of an instant: the "meeting of the minds."
106. See generally Original Great Am. Chocolate Chip Cookie Co. v. River Valley
Cookies, Ltd., 970 F.2d 273, 280 (7th Cir. 1992), in which Judge Posner denied that "judges
have carte blanche to declare contractual provisions negotiated by competent adults unreasonable and to refuse to enforce them" and stated: "We understand the duty of good faith in
contract law differently. There is no blanket duty of good faith; nor is reasonableness the test
of good faith."
107. M. FURMSTON, CHESHIRE & FIFOOT'S LAW OF CONTRACT 12-13 (10th ed., 1981)
(characterizing Nineteenth-century case law).
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4. Exclude Norms Which Were Not and Would Not Have Been
Created by the Parties
So-the flip side of positivism-the law should be reluctant to undertake to create duties for contracting parties; it should stick to what
they have settled (together, perhaps, with what they would have settled:
see the next subsection). It should eschew norms which lie off the charts
of normal Utility Contract anthropology: obligations of self-sacrifice;
any duty to "renounce thought of self."
5. Fill Gaps Parsimoniously and Only as Normal Utility Contractors
Would ' '
What, though, about those recurrent situations in which the determinations of the parties are incomplete or fuzzy? Some contractualist
writings seem to say that fiduciary doctrines can be explained as the fillers for this sort of gap. We have seen that this is not true in the primitive sense: Justice Hornbook would not arrive at fiduciary duties that
way.1" Is it true in a more advanced sense?
The academic literature contains two principal lines of approach to
incomplete contracts. One recommends that the judge in some such
situations apply the terms that the parties themselves would have ap-

108. Another precept would be: Treat Contract as a Unified Field; Eschew SubjectMatter Differentiation. Professor Friedman has noted that modern contract law "is abstraction . . . all particularities of person and subject-matter are removed." L. FRIEDMAN,
CONTRACT LAW IN AMERICA 20 (1965). It is "blind to the details of subject matter and person." "In the lav of contract it does not matter whether the subject of the contract is a goat, a
horse, a carload of lumber, a stock certificate, or a shoe." Id. See ATIYAH, supra note 105, at
400 for an account of the spread, during the period 1770-1870, of the idea of the "generality of
contract law, the fact that it could be stated at a high level of abstraction, and that the laws
applied indifferently to all kinds of contracts irrespective of subject-matter." See Cehave NV
v. Bremer Handelgesellschaft mbH, (1976) QB 44 at 71, [1975] All E.R. 739 at 756 (Roskill,
LJ.) ("In principle it is not easy to see why the law relating to contracts for the sale of goods
should be different from the law relating to the performance of other contractual obligations,
whether charter parties or other types of contract.... It is desirable that the same legal principle should apply to law of Contract as a whole ...").
Contrast fiduciary law, which is not fully unified under articulated doctrines: trust law is
trust law first; guardianship is guardianship; director-corporation is a matter of corporate law.
Each fiduciary category has retained its persona. Authorities in one area are not decisive in
adjudication in another. See generally Hospital Products Ltd. v. United States Surgical Corp.
(Austl. 1984) 156 C.L.R. 41 ("I doubt if it is fruitful to attempt to make a general statement of
the circumstances in which a fiduciary relationship will be found to exist. Fiduciary relations
are of different types, carrying different obligations and a test which might seem appropriate
to determine whether a fiduciary relationship existed for one purpose might be quite inappropriate for another purpose.").
109. See supra, Part V.B.1.
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plied had they reached a bargain under optimal conditions and agreed
upon terms for the "gap." (Judge Posner seems to recommend this approach,"0 and Judge Easterbrook and Professor Fischel seem to think it
leads to fiduciary duties."'). The other recommends that the judges look
beyond the specific bargain and its parties and apply the rule that would
be best from the point of view of its effects on contracting generally (or
on contracts of that "type"). Neither approach leads to fiduciary law,
for two reasons.
First, as proponents of both approaches candidly admit, judges can
easily get it wrong. To quote Judge Posner,

[t]he people who make a transaction-thus putting their money

where their mouths are-ordinarily are more trustworthy judges

of their self-interest than a judge (or jury), who has neither a personal stake in nor first-hand acquaintance with the venture
on
3
which the parties embarked when they signed the contract.1
If the good of contracting is entirely a matter of pleasures, satisfactions,

and preferences; if it lies entirely in foro interno; if parties always ration110. "[Tlhe overriding purpose of contact law... [is] to give the parties what they would
have stipulated for expressly if at the time of making the contract they had had complete
knowledge of the future and the costs of negotiating and adding provisions to the contract
had been zero." Market St. Assoc. v. Frey, 941 F.2d 588 (7th Cir. 1991) (Posner, J.).
111. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, supra note 2, at 429
("[T]he law is designed to promote the parties' own perception of their joint welfare. That
objective calls for filling gaps in fiduciary relations the same way courts fill gaps in other contracts. The subject matter may differ, but the objective and therefore the process is identical.").
112. Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Mitigation Principal: Toward a General
Theory of ContractualObligation, 69 VA. L. REV. 967, 971 (1983) (recommending that default rules be established based in part on what most bargainers would prefer); see Douglas G.
Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, FraudulentConveyance Law and its Proper Domain, 38 VAND.
L. REV. 829, 835-36 (1985) (stating that rules in debtor-creditor relationships "should provide
all the parties with the type of contract that they would have agreed to if they had had the
time and money to bargain over all aspects of their deal"). See generally Randy E. Barnett,
The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 78 VA. L. REV. 821 (1992);
Steven J. Burton, Default Principles,Legitimacy, and the Authority of a Contract, 3 S. CAL.
INTERDISC. L.J. 115, 118 (1993); David Charny, Hypothetical Bargains: The Normative
Structure of ContractInterpretation,89 MICH. L. REV. 1815 (1991); Jules L. Coleman et al., A
BargainingTheory Approach to Default Provisions and DisclosureRules in ContractLaw, 12
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 639 (1989); Lawrence A. Cunningham, Hermeneutics and Contract
Default Rules: An Essay on Lieber and Corbin, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 2225, 2235 (1995);
Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 608
(1998); Dennis Patterson, The Pseudo-Debateover Default Rules in ContractLaw, 3 S. CAL.
INTERDISC. L.J. 235, 236-37 (1993).
113.

POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS,

supra note 4, at 93.
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ally seek it, then little can be achieved by a judge who undertakes to revise their determinations (for example by making "intersubjective comparisons of utility"). He can only engage in judicial guesswork, unreliable because of the idiosyncratic nature of the parties' appetites and
preference scales."4 (In the fairly recent case of Jordan v. Duff &
Phelps, Inc.,l" Judges Easterbrook and Posner applied their technique
to a fairly straightforward problem but bitterly disagreed as to its outcome.).

Because judges can easily go wrong, they should be parsimonious;
reluctant to adopt aggressive and sweeping doctrines like those found in
fiduciary law. Being parsimonious will sometimes mean refusing to give
any legal effect to the agreement because of its failure of specificity.,
This can be justified as a "penalty default" which gives subsequent contracting parties an incentive to be specific and complete."
Second, any inferences made by judges who accept utilitarian ethics
and anthropology is for obvious reasons unlikely to attribute to parties
the self-sacrificing motives prominent in fiduciary law. Justice Jurisprudence would follow Justice Hornbook in seeing little warrant for fiduciary duties such as those requiring self-sacrifice and renunciation of self.
D. Where Does All This Take JusticeJurisprudencein Fiduciary
Lawsuits?

If he encountered a lawsuit involving trusteeship, or the attorneyclient relationship, or one of the other standard relationships, Justice Jurisprudence would ask himself whether the conditions for and the elements of a Utility Contract are present and would seldom find them; he
114. See generally Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic ContractualInefficiency and
the Optimal Choice of Legal Rules, 101 YALE LJ. 729,733 (1992) ("[O]ur model suggests that

there is small hope that lawmakers will be able to divine the efficient rule in practice.").
115. Jordan v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1987).
116. Seesupra note 48.
117. Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic

Theory of DefaultRules, 99 YALE L.i. 87, 97 (1989). For a criticism of penalty-default analysis, see Jay M. Feinman, Relational Contract and Default Rules, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 43,
50-51 (1993).

Perhaps some fiduciary duties could be defended as efficient "penalty defaults" as that
concept is developed in this article. See generally iL at 98-99 (noting the justifiability of default terms which specially disadvantage the better-informed party). This line of argument
could not, however, be extended so as to justify imposing the full panoply of fiduciary duties;
that would be to impose a penalty inefficiently disproportionate to the benefit. Further, many
judgments as to the utility of penalty-default terms are far more uncertain-hard to arrive at
with assurance-than those about the utility of gap-filling terms aimed to effect efficiencies
for the parties.
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would examine the adjudicative techniques recommended for Utility
Contracts and find them to miscarry. When he turned to the substance
of fiduciary law he would find much of it indefensible, just as Justice
Hornbook did but for more theoretical reasons.
1. He Would Object to the Permissiveness of Fiduciary Law as to
Formation Procedures
Justice Hornbook doubted that Alethia and Agatha had ever entered into a binding relationship with Roger, so tentative and preliminary was their "moment of formation. 11. Justice Jurisprudence would
have similar doubts. Utility Contract analysis is demanding about formation; fiduciary law is permissive and ready-too ready, he would conclude-to recognize formation."9
2. He Would Object to the Nonpositive Character of Many Fiduciary
Doctrines
Justice Hornbook doubted that Alethia and Agatha had imposed on
Roger many of the broad duties alluded to in their lawsuit, such as duties of loyalty and zeal. Justice Jurisprudence would have similar
doubts: As they are created by judges, most fiduciary doctrines are unwarranted to maximize utility.
3. He Would Object to the Post-Formation Provenance of Certain
Obligations of the Fiduciary
Justice Hornbook had difficulty with certain aspects of Alethia's and
Agatha's case: in particular, those aspects which attributed to Roger duties to look after needs and respond to requests which emerged after the
formation of the relationship. Justice Jurisprudence would agree: fiduciary law's attentiveness to developments after the moment of formation
would seem unjustifiable to him except in instances where the parties
amend the contract in a procedure reflecting renewed utility calculations.

118. See supra note 105.
119. Furthermore, Justice Jurisprudence would refuse to adopt fiduciary law's permissive attitude towards incapacity (and some other formation defects). Fiduciary law accepts
that a binding relationship can be created between a guardian or trustee, on the one hand,
and a minor or a lunatic; this makes little sense from the point of view of utilitarian ethics and
anthropology since the incapacitated party's utility calculations do not deserve deference.
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4. He Would Object to the Self-Sacrifice Requirements of Fiduciary
Law
Justice Hornbook was unable to find a sufficient basis for the duties
of zeal, self-sacrifice, and similar generous, benefit-conferring aspects of
the fiduciary relationship: for such principles as that "thought of self
must be renounced." This aspect of fiduciary law seemed misguided to
Justice Jurisprudence because, as suggested above,1" he believes selfinterest is the engine that makes utility contracts utile.
E. Conclusion

Thus, Justice Jurisprudence will likely reach the same conclusion as
did Justice Hornbook: in many fiduciary relationships, and as regards
many requirements of fiduciary law, eschew enforcement. This is sufficient to refute one of Judge Easterbrook's and Professor Fischel's prin12
cipal endeavors, which was to construct "a theory of what judges do., '
VII. PRESCRIPTIVE CONTRACTUALISM

Usually you think of Chicago School people as wielding the surgical
knife; so maybe their real project is not descriptive but radically prescriptive. That seems to be a deeper implication of Judge Easterbrook's
and Professor Fischel's assertion that "[f]iduciary duties ...

moral

have no

footing."12
A. PrescribingWhat?

Here is where we ought to discuss the merits of a prescriptive project; but we are handicapped by the fact that Judge Easterbrook and Professor Fischel and Judge Posner do not identify one. We need to see a
careful description of what an attorney's duties to his client look like, for
example, after they have been "contractualized." We need to hear what
trustees do for trust beneficiaries, where trust duties to be zealous and
avoid interested transaction profiting end up, and similar things about
partners, guardians, and other fiduciaries.
If a case has not been stated it normally need not be answered; but
because contractualism is a widespread phenomenon we had better pur120. See supra Part VI. D.
121. Easterbrook & Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, supra note 2 at 429 ("[W]e
seek knowledge of when fiduciary duties arise and what form they take, not a theory of rhetoric-a theory of what judges do, not of explanations they give. [The objection] that the contractual perspective cannot explain the structure of legal rules ... is compelling, if true.").
122. Id.at 427.
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sue the matter further. Here, then, is an outline of what seem to be the
elements of this unstated case: (1) Utility is not only a good, but the
good; in this area, the principal guide to the law; (2) When it comes to
affiliations, Utility Contracts serve this good best; other sorts of affiliation may not serve it at all; and therefore (3) Other forms of affiliation
are best left unenforced or else enforced only to the extent that elements of them can be fitted into the Utility Contract mold. All judges, it
follows, should think like Justice Jurisprudence and dismiss lawsuits like
Alethia's and Agatha's.
B. How PrescriptiveContractualismMiscarries
1. Fiduciary Relationships Are a Social Phenomenon
Fiduciary relationships are not creatures only of law and lawyers.
Fiduciary relationships and fiduciary duties reflect the precepts of social
morality and practice. Alasdair MacIntyre illustrates this idea with a description of a fishing crew:
Consider... a crew whose members ... have acquired... an un-

derstanding of and devotion to excellence in fishing and to excellence in playing one's part as a member of such a crew. The
dependence of each member on the qualities of character and
skills of others will be accompanied by a recognition that from
time to time one's own life will be in danger and that whether
one drowns or not may depend upon someone else's courage.
And the consequent concern of each member of the crew.., will
characteristically have to extend to those for whom those others
care: the members of their immediate families ...

and perhaps

beyond them to the whole society of a fishing village. When
someone dies at sea, fellow crew members, their families and the
rest of the fishing community will share a common affliction and
common responsibilities.12
These fishermen are fiduciaries for one another-not in the eyes of
the law, but in their own eyes; in one another's eyes; socially; as a matter
of social morality. That is, they are bound, through social morality, by
standards of conduct similar to those which traditional fiduciary law
recognizes. Their obligations to one another evolve and cannot be
123. A Partial Response to My Critics, in AFTER MACINTYRE:
CRITICAL
PERSPECTIVES ON THE WORK OF ALASDAIR MACINTYRE 283,284-85 (J. Horton & S. Mendes eds., 1994).
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traced to an act of the will jointly made at the moment of formation.
They are expected to be self-sacrificing and zealous in one another's
service. They renounce exclusive thought of self.
Some fiduciary relationships arose primarily as social institutions.
This was the case, for example, with the etymologically primal fiduciary,
the Roman fiduciarius." Under Roman law certain classes of personsmost unmarried adults-were disqualified to receive property by inheritance.
In order to circumvent these... restrictions ... the practice had
grown up... of requesting a validly appointed heir... to make
over the whole or some part of what he received to the person
whom the testator wished to benefit. Such a request was without
legal effect: its fulfillment was "committed to the faith of" the
heir ....
This entrusted heir was called fiduciarius. The root is fides-meaning
faith, confidence, reliance, trust, and belief."
124. Similarly, the trust arose out of the charter, the stipulatio of the magnate, and the
practices of the religious order, drawing on various legal traditions but in no way the wholecloth creation of English positive law. See Brendan R. Brown, The EcclesiasticalOrigin of the
Use, 10 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 353 (1935); Henry Cattan, The Law of Waqf, in LAW IN THE
MIDDLE EAST 203 (Khaddari & Liebesng ed. 1955); Monica M. Gaudiosi, The Influence of
the Islamic Law of Waqf on the Development of the Trust in England: The Case of Merton
College, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1231 (1988); Vincent R. Vasey, Fideicommisa and Uses: The
Clerical Connection Revisited, 42 JURIST 201 (1982). See generallyLangbein, supra note 2, at
632-43.
125. B. NICHOLAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAW 267 (1962).
126. The classic account of fides appears in Cicero:
The command of confidence can be secured [here, throughout, fides is translated confidence] ... [first], if people think us possessed of practical wisdom combined with a sense of justice. For we have confidence in those who we think have
more understanding than ourselves, who, we believe, have better insight into the future, and who, when an emergency arises and a crisis comes, can clear away the difficulties and reach a safe decision according to the exigencies of the occasion; for
that kind of wisdom the world accounts genuine and practical. [Second], confidence
is reposed in men who are just and true-that is, good men-on the definite assumption that their characters admit of no suspicion of dishonesty or wrong-doing. And
so we believe that it is perfectly safe to entrust our lives, our fortunes, and our children to their care.
Of these two qualities [practical wisdom and justice], justice has the greater
power to inspire confidence, for even without the aid of wisdom it has considerable
weight: but wisdom without justice is of no avail to inspire confidence; for take from
a man his reputation for probity, and the more shrewd and clever he is, the more
hated and mistrusted he becomes. Therefore, justice combined with practical wis-
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Today as well, many fiduciary relationships are structured outside
the positive law: by custom, for example, and by authorities on professional ethics. Social fiduciary relationships are supported by traditional
social virtues such as loyalty, civility, self-sacrifice, vocational excellence,
and high standards of honesty.' 27 Even many business institutions, such
as the corporation and the investment company, are a composite of contractual relationships and social fiduciary ones: a fiduciary element is
involved in their relationships with lawyers, investment bankers, directors, and officers. It is not only from the Utility Contract with the
butcher and the baker that we expect our dinner.
2. Disrupting the Continuity Between Law and Social Fiduciary
Morality Would Undermine the Legitimacy of Important Institutions
Professor Coleman notes in his book Markets, Morals and The Law:
Traditional economic analysis is consequentialist .... Moreover,
it believes that what is to be justified are particular events or
rules, in isolation .... Constitutionalists, in contrast, believe that
individual events-policies, market transactions, political decisions or the like-can be given content or meaning only within
an institutional framework. In the constitutionalist view, the
proper object of justification is not an event or rule in isolation
but the network of rules that gives it life and substance. Moreover, these institutions are to be measured not by their effect on
the pursuit of some socially desirable end state, for example,
their capacity to increase social wealth; rather, their measure is
the acceptance they secure within a given population or community.'1
This suggests an institutional constitutionalist objection to contractualism. The fiduciary nature of the professional, and the fiduciary
structure of institutions such as hospitals, residential care facilities,
charitable trusts, educational institutions, and some of the great law
dor will command all the confidence we can desire; justice without wisdom will not
be able to do much; wisdom without justice will be of no avail at all.
De Officiis II, IX, at 203 .33 (Walter Miller trans., 1943).
127. Social recognition of the fiduciary role is reflected in what Marleen O'Connor calls
the distinctive rhetoric of fiduciary relationship. Marleen A. O'Connor, How Should We Talk
About Fiduciary Duty? Directors' Conflict-of-Interest Transactionsand the ALl's Principles
of CorporateGovernance,6 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 954 (1993).
128. JULES L. COLEMAN, MARKETS, MORALS AND THE LAW 135 (1988).
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firms is important not only to the participants but to outside parties-to
the public generally and to the honor and stability of the social order. If
the law were to change the conduct of lawyers and of the officers, directors and trustees of business and charitable institutions in a contractualist direction, it might undermine their acceptability to the public. An attitude of hard-nosed self-seeking on the part of some lawyers, including
partners at prominent law firms, has surely contributed to the decline in
respect for the legal profession.'29
3. Disrupting the Continuity Between Law and Social Fiduciary
Morality Would Be Disutile
A large canvas for disutility arguments is spread by Professor Francis
Fukuyama in his recent book Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation
of Prosperity.'30 This book advances the thesis that "trust"-bonding
beyond the family-is an important contributor to economic development. A legal system which neglected commitments of loyalty would
probably undermine this social characteristic.
VIII. BEYOND PRESCRIPTIVE CONTRACTUALISM

A more fundamental objection to prescriptive contractualism looks
beyond legitimacy-based and utility-based arguments and asserts that
fiduciary affiliations serve different purposes than those known to utilitarianism. Different purposes call for different structures; in many instances, fiduciary law fits better.
A. Beyond UtilitarianEthics and Anthropology: There Are Goods
Other Than Utility and People Really Seek Them
Are there goods other than utility? In another context Judge Posner
concedes that "the term efficiency, when used as in this book to denote
that allocation of resources in which value is maximized, has limitations
as an ethical criterion of social decision making. Utility in the utilitarian
sense also has grave limitations ... ,,1 "IT]here is more to justice than
economics, a point the reader should keep in mind in evaluating norma129. See SOL M. LINOWITZ, THE BETRAYED PROFESSION: LAWYERING AT THE END
OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1994). Linowitz notes a 1993 poll finding that almost a third
of Americans thought that lawyers were "less honest than most people." Id. at 24.
130. FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, TRUST:
PROSPERITY (1995).

THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE CREATION OF

131. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 4, at 13. The next sentence states:
"The fact that one person has a greater capacity for pleasure than another is not a very good
reason for a forced transfer of wealth from the second to the first."
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tive statements in this book. 1 32 But Judge Posner dismisses any systematic analysis with the airy comment that "[o]ther familiar ethical criteria
have their own serious problems." 33
Are there motives other than the pursuit of utility? Prominent
economists accept that there are (although some forget this once they
get down to grinding out the theoretical sausages). Thus Professor
Amartya Sen writes: "A divergence between choice and well-being can
easily arise when behavior is influenced by some motivation other than
the pursuit of one's own interest or welfare (e.g., through a sense of
commitment, or respect for duty)."' 4
Some classic economists including Adam Smith 3 ' embraced similar
views: Although people often do pursue each his own utility (especially,
one author notes, in special situations such as "war and trade" 36 ), not
everyone acts that way all the time.
A "thought experiment" based on Robert Nozick's Anarchy, State
132. Id. at 27. The complete quotation from this passage is as follows:
But there is more to notions of justice than a concern with efficiency. It is not obviously inefficient to allow suicide pacts; to allow private discrimination on racial, religious, or sexual grounds; to permit killing and eating the weakest passenger in the
lifeboat in circumstances of genuine desperation; to force people to give selfincriminating testimony; to flog prisoners; to allow babies to be sold for adoption; to
allow the use of deadly force in defense of a pure property interest; to legalize
blackmail; or to give convicted felons a choice between imprisonment and participation in dangerous medical experiments. Yet all these things offend the sense of justice of modern Americans, and all are to a greater or lesser (usually greater) extent
illegal. An effort will be made in this book to explain some of these prohibitions in
economic terms, but most cannot be; there is more to justice than economics, a point
the reader should keep in mind in evaluating normative statements in this book.
Further important concessions about the defects of the theory that wealth maximization
should guide policy are set forth in RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF
JURISPRUDENCE 374-87 (1990). See generally Martha C. Nussbaum, Flawed Foundations:
The Philosophical Critique of a ParticularType of Economics, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1197
(1997).
133. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 4, at 13. "Although no effort will be
made in this book to defend efficiency as the only worthwhile criterion of social choice, the
book does assume, and most people probably would agree, that it is an important criterion."

Id.
134. Sen, supra note 97, at 386. See also DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS
(1984); John Watkins, Second Thoughts on Self Interest and Morality, in PARADOXES OF
RATIONALITY AND COOPERATION:

PRISONER'S DILEMMA AND NEWCOMB'S PROBLEM

(Richard Campbell & Lanning Sowden eds., 1985).
135. Sen, supra note 97, at 386.
136. F.Y. EDGEWORTH, MATHEMATICAL PSYCHICS: AN ESSAY ON THE APPLICATION
OF MATHEMATICS TO THE MORAL SCIENCES 52 (1881).
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and Utopia supports these views:
Suppose there were an experience machine that would give you
any experience you desired. Superduper neuropsychologists
could stimulate your brain so that you would think and feel you
were writing a great novel, or making a friend, or reading an interesting book. All the time you would be floating in a tank, with
electrodes attached to your brain. Should you plug into this machine for life, preprogramming your life's experiences? ... Of
course, while in the tank you won't know that you're there; you'll
think it's all actually happening."... Would you plug in? What

else can matter to us, other than how our lives feel from the inside? '

Several years' worth of asking this question of students confirms what
common sense in any event suggests: most people would not get in the
machine, and thus most people do not make pleasure or any other experience the point of it all.'39 Utility is not the only motive. If you would
not get into the machine, you accept the guidance of goods other than
pleasure or any other experience.
Another argument to this effect is advanced by Professor Sen:
The hopeless beggar, the precarious landless labourer, the dominated housewife, the hardened unemployed or the over-

exhausted coolie may all take pleasures in small mercies, and
manage to suppress intense suffering for the necessity of continuing survival, but it would be ethically deeply mistaken to attach a correspondingly small value to the loss of their well-being
because of this survival strategy. 14

137. ROBERT NOZiCK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA, 42-43 (1974).

138. The omitted text here is: "Others can also plug in to have the experiences they
want, so there's no need to stay unplugged to serve them." Id.
139. Suppose you were injected with a drug that deprived you of the ability to experience pleasure, pain, or any others of the feelings which consequentialists might identify as the
point of life. Suppose you were an athlete, scheduled to compete in the Olympic hundred
meter tomorrow, but were deprived permanently of any ability to derive any experiential
good from the endeavor. Would you run the race? (Leave aside the possibility that you
might be obliged to do so in order to foster the pleasures of others. Assume that as much
pain as pleasure would be occasioned by your competing: pain, for example, to your defeated
opponents and their supporters.) Again, several years' worth of students attest to a widespread attraction to the course of participating in the event.
140. SEN, supra note 95, at 45-46.
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There is something bad about the conditions in which such people find
themselves, one must agree, that goes beyond the suffering.'

If there

are goods beyond that identified by preference utilitarianism, then you
have a reason to live and your neighbor has a reason to refrain from
rubbing the lamp. And surely there may be.
B. Justice is a Good
Justice requires some allocations and forbids others. It forbids giving a fatal disease to an innocent person. It forbids hanging him. It for-

bids enslaving subject peoples. 42 It forbids allocating the art treasures of

Europe to Hitler. Precepts like these are not just rules of thumb about
how to maximize utility. Better free the slaves than offer them the machine; liberate Europe and defeat the Reich rather than give all the vic-

tims a drug against pain; the justice done by Lincoln and Churchill was a
good beyond its affective consequences.
The same can be said about less dramatic instances. Justice demands
the return of stolen property, the payment of debts, and the performance of obligations under partnership agreements. You should stay out
of the machine for the purpose of paying your debts, for example, and
for purposes of sticking with your marriage. (It would be no substitute
to put your creditor into the machine, or your spouse.).

141. The above arguments relate to classic, pleasure-and-pains utilitarianism. Similar
arguments can be deployed successfully against preference utilitarianism as follows. Less fortunate than Aladdin, you rub a lamp which turns out to be inhabited by a malevolent Genie.
Towering above you in the clouds, he announces that he has become your Anti-Servant:
never again will any of your wishes be granted-never will any of your preferences be satisfied; he will follow you around forever and see to that. Is life any longer worth living? Is
there anything left to live for? If you think there is, then you apprehend the existence of
some good for you other than the satisfaction of your preferences.
Out of a lesser lamp emerges a better Genie, but a weaker one. He cannot overcome the
efforts of the malevolent one, but will do what he can do for you in any other way. Is this a
comfort and a palliation of your distress? He might bring you good things you never dreamed
of and so never "preferred." If you think he can do you some good you are not a pure preference utilitarian.
Your neighbor finds a lamp which contains a Preference Genie. Should he rub the lamp?
If he does, a Genie will tower over him throughout life, making sure that he obtains exactly
what he prefers. But this preference Genie is a jealous Genie, and will see to it that nothing
happens that your neighbor has not identified as desirable and embraced as among his preferences. Should he rub the lamp; is there any line of thought which would reasonably lead
him to refrain?
142. See POSNER, supra note 132, at 374-77 (conceding that the wealth-maximization
principle would under some circumstances justify slavery and listing this as among the unanswerableobjections to the wealth-maximization principle as a guide to law).
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Utilitarianism makes no sufficient place for justice. 43 Judge Posner
generously admits something like this: "Since economics does not answer the question whether the existing distribution of income and
wealth is good or bad, just or unjust... neither does it answer the ultimate question whether an efficient allocation of resources would be socially or ethically desirable." '44
Utility will sometimes be enhanced by unjust projects. For example,
secretly inducing cancer in order to do medical research on the victim
may be utile.1 45 Hanging an innocent man to avert a riot may be utile.
Enriching the undeserving is utile if they take a disproportionate pleasure in wealth.'" Utilitarianism cannot recommend a permanent grasp
on rules and principles of justice: it makes rules of justice into rules of
thumb, to be disregarded when circumstances require.
C. Some FiduciaryRelationshipsareAimed at Doing JusticeAmong
Beneficiaries..
The relationship of the representative with the class in class-action
litigation is a good example. He has a duty to be fair in distributing
benefits and burdens.' His affiliation, in other words, serves justice, not
143. But cf. Harsanyi, Rule Utilitarianism,supra note 88, at 25 (discussing how rule Utili-

tarianism may escape this criticism).
144. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 4, at 14. See R.G. Frey, Introduction:
Utilitarianismand Persons, in UTILITY AND RIGHTS 3 (R.G. Frey ed., 1984) ("[W]hat cen-

trally matters in [utilitarianism] ...is the amount of pleasure in the world, not its distribution.").
145. Philippa Foot, Utilitarianism and the Virtues, in CONSEQUENTIALISM AND ITS
CRITICS 224 (Samuel Scheffler ed., 1988). See also John Rawls, Classical Utilitarianism,in id
at 1. An attempt to respond to this sort of argument appears in Dan W. Brock, Utilitarianism
and Aiding Others, in THE LIMITS OF UTILITARIANISM 225 (Harlan B. Miller & William H.
Williams eds., 1982). A similar line of analysis can be developed under the choice utilitarian
formula: Many people would choose or prefer a cure to a deadly disease; they might prefer it
over the life of a stranger's baby.
146. A utilitarian defense, partly successful, to some of these criticisms can be termed
the "publicity-effect defense." Hanging the innocent man may forestall the riot but it may
nevertheless be disufile because of the publicity effect-the spread of the knowledge that
judges hang innocent people will make everyone insecure. This defense fails where the innocence of the victim can be kept secret. It also fails where the public is confident that "it can't
happen to people like us." Injustice to a racial minority, for example, may never make the
majority uncomfortable. Injustice to children and babies may not make grownups as uncomfortable.
147. It might well be argued that all relationships, including nonfiduciary, contractual
ones, aim or should aim in part at doing justice, since even arms-length buyers and sellers
ought to be fair to one another. See generally James Gordley, Equality in Exchange, 69 Cal.
L. Rev. 1587 (1981).
148. See generally Lazos, supra note 18.
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merely utility. His obligations look backwards in time, not forwards;
and they do not rest on an assessment of the pleasure one or another
members of the class may take in compensation nor on the ordering of
their preferences. The same can be said of a trustee in bankruptcy when
he determines how assets should be distributed among creditors and of a
corporate director when he decides how to distribute dividends among
classes of stock.149 Something similar can be said of a lawyer called upon
to adjust the interests of a class of clients in litigation, and of Roger's activities in arranging financing for AA Corporation (since that involved
adjusting the relationships between Alethia and Agatha and other participants in the business).
D. Virtue-A Fully Developed, Well-FunctioningCharacter-isa Good
Professor Nozick's thought experiment may suggest that it is mainly
for the sake of activities that we would stay out of the machine. But
surely not only activities,'O but attributes of character as well. Suppose
the machine was structured so as to require the sacrifice not only of our
activities and projects-not only of what we might do-suppose it deprived us of much of what we are. Suppose that a lifetime inside incurs
the loss of the capacities of the mind and the coherence of the personality. Suppose your memory deteriorates, your logic slips, your reason
clouds over, and your judgment wobbles.' Suppose the effects of the
machine are like those of alcoholism. Is it all worth it for the pleasure it
buys? These hypotheticals indicate that there is a good in virtue-the
virtues, taking that word to mean worthwhile attributes of the character-that there is a good in virtue beyond its utility.'52
149. See generally Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1947).
150. Certainly not only physical activities, for a start. Projects of the mind as well, notably the practice of thought and reason. Similarly many projects which involve a combination
of the powers of mind and body-to reason out what is just, for example, and then to instantiate it by participating with Lincoln in freeing the slaves or with Churchill in resisting the Nazis
-if the opportunity to join in such a project came our way we would be happy to pursue it
rather than enter the machine.
151. Actually it could not be structured any other way, since we would be sure to deteriorate during a lifetime without mental activities other than those involved in experiencing.
152. To demonstrate this further, imagine you have the opportunity to enter a Virtue
Machine. Enter it, not for your entire life but just for a few hours, and it will enhance your
character in whatever ways you request. It can make you wiser and smarter and more generous and braver. But the price is a diminution in your pleasure. It knows the patterns and
mechanisms of your pleasures and pains and will make life materially less pleasant for you
forever thereafter. Many people would pay this price and enter the machine. If you would,
you have accepted that there is some good for you in virtue beyond its consequences as to
pleasures and pains.
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Utilitarianism cannot accept the good of the virtues except as instruments for pleasure. 53 Posnerian analysis is to the same effect:
"Honesty, trustworthiness, and love reduce the cost of transactions. '
Therefore, utilitarianism will sometimes recommend decisions which
distort the personality. An individual seeking to enhance his own utility
under Stalinism would be best advised to jettison habits of courageous
speech and independent analysis. Utilitarianism cannot recommend a
permanent grasp on virtue: A virtue should be discarded when it is no
longer serviceable to utility. If the regime changes and Stalinism is replaced by Thatcherism utility is served by a change of character. An individual seeking to enhance his own utility in a modem liberal social order might be well advised to abandon those virtues which demand too
much in the way of loyalty to friends and family.
E. Some FiduciaryRelationshipsare Aimed at the Promotion of the
Virtues of Beneficiaries
The fiduciary duties of the guardian are a good example. They include the duty to educate and "to maximize opportunities for the ward's
personal growth.""55 The guardian of a minor is a substitute parent: he
should help educate the child not only vocationally but also morally; not
only to earn a good living but also to lead a good life.
The responsibilities of attorneys are to some extent similar. Assisting in the development of the virtues-especially the civic virtues-is
one important aspect of the attorney-client relationship. Especially in
business practice and other non-litigation situations, good lawyering involves more than seeing to it that the client wins; it has an educational
side: It involves helping him fit himself to live well in his moral and social culture."6
F. Some FiduciaryRelationshipsAlso Promotethe Virtue and Justice of
the Fiduciary
In the Utility Contract each party acts for the sake of what he may
get from the other and each would just as soon avoid giving much in exchange. In many fiduciary relationships, however, the fiduciary rightly
regards the conferral of fiduciary benefits as a good for himself as well
153. See generally Roger Crisp, Utilitarianism and the Life of Virtue, 42 PHIL.

(1992); Foot, supra note 145.
154. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 4, at 261.
155. Casasanto et al., supra note 12, at 543,548.
156. See THOMAS SHAFFER, FAITH AND THE PROFESSIONS 131-34 (1987).
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as for the beneficiary. The lawyer may not practice only for the fee, nor
the doctor or guardian for a stipend. Their roles involve the development of their own characters; growth in maturity; enhancement
of wis7
dom; and attainment, even, of some degree of nobility.'
G. Freedom is a Good
Prominent writers tell us that freedom is something bestowed on

mankind by nature (Aquinas),5 ' "our most precious possession"
(Cicero)," 9 "God's most precious gift to human nature, for by it we are
made happy here as men, and happy as gods in the beyond" (Dante),W
"the natural condition of the human race" (Lincoln), 6' "our unalterable
destiny" (Schiller), 62
'" "an inalienable ingredient in what makes human
beings human" (Berlin),'63 something "of which a human being cannot
divest himself or be deprived without temporarily or permanently ceasing to be human" (Oakeshott), 4 and the source of love (Schiller). 6
157. See Robert Sokolowski, The Fiduciary Relationship and the Nature of Professions,
PHILOSOPHICAL AND CULTURAL ASPECTS 23
(Edmund D. Pellegrino et al. eds., 1991).
158. Thomas Aquinas, On the Sentences II, 44, i, 3, reply to obj. 1, reprinted in The
Pocket Aquinas 234 (Vernon J. Bourke trans., 1960) ("Nature has made all men equal in liberty....").
159. Marcus Tulius Cicero, Letter to Atticus of October 25, 44 B.C., in 3 LETTERS TO
ATTICUS 329, 330-31 (E.O. Winstedt trans., 1918) ("De libertate retinenda, qua certe nihil est
dulcius .... ").
160. DANTE ALIGHIERI, Monarchy, Book One, XII, in MONARCHY AND THREE
POLITICAL LETTERS 1309-17 (Donald Nicholl trans., Garland Library ed., 1947). To be precise, one should note that Dante is speaking here of "the fundamental principle of our freedom," namely "free choice." Id- at 18. Dante also states that "the human race is at its best
when most free." Id.
161. BRUCE CATTON, THE COMING FURY 240 (1961) (quoting L.E. CHITTENDEN,
in ETHICS, TRUST, AND THE PROFESSIONS:

RECOLLECTIONS OF PRESIDENT LINCOLN AND HIS ADMINISTRATION 72-76 (quoting Abra-

ham Lincoln)).
As to slavery .... [t]he voice of the civilized world is against it; it is opposed to its
growth or extension. Freedom is the natural condition of the human race, in which
the Almighty intended men to live. Those who fight the purposes of the Almighty
will not succeed. They always have been, and they always will be, beaten.
162. R.D. MILLER, SCHILLER AND THE IDEAL OF FREEDOM 21 (1970) (quoting Johann

von Schiller).
163. ISAIAH BERLIN, FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY, at lx (1969) ("[T]hose who have ever
valued liberty for its own sake believed that to be free to choose, and not to be chosen for, is
an inalienable ingredient in what makes human beings human....").
164. Michael Oakeshott, A Place of Learning, in The Colorado College Studies, No. 12,
at 7 (Jan. 1975).
165. MILLER, supra note 162, at 21 (quoting Johann von Schiller).

1999]

FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIPS ARE NOT CONTRACTS

349

Utilitarianism suggests that freedom is an instrumental good; free
markets, for example, maximize utility. But surely freedom is more than
instrumentally good. Merely instrumental goods are dispensable, once
their objects are achieved, but who would agree to give up his freedom
once it had been employed in producing enough wealth? 6' Similarly,
merely instrumental goods need not be afforded people who cannot or
will not use them to pursue the relevant object, but who would approve
of a government which deprived people of freedom on grounds of incompetence or unwillingness to compete in the marketplace?
Freedom seems to be a noninstrumental ("final") good in at least
two principal ways. First, freedom relates to the moral standing of good
action. When an action is a good one; when the objective, foro externo
aspects of the action are commendable-then not only the act but also
the person himself-the actor-may deserve credit. Freedom is a necessary condition for this. Only when he exercises freedom in acting is he
fully the author of the act and only then does he fully deserve credit for
it.167

Second, freedom is a component of learning, self-development, and
self-realization."' Doing good things and participating in good projects
is a way to develop one's knowledge of their goodness. 69 Doing good
things and participating in good projects is a way of bringing their goodness into yourself and making it a part of yourself.17
166. But cf F.A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 29 (1960) ("If there were
omniscient men, if we could know not only all that affects the attainment of our present
wishes but also our future wants and desires, there would be little case for liberty.").
167. See GERALD DWORKIN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY 110 (1988)
("It is because other persons are creators of their own lives, are shapers of their own values,
are the originators of projects and plans, that their interests must be taken into account, their
rights respected, their projects valued.").
168. See JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 88 (1980).
169. Thought without action cannot achieve this fully: You could not really know intimately the good of loyalty to one's spouse or children without being married and caring for
children.
170. See POPE JOHN PAUL II, APOSTOLIC EXHORTATION: THE ROLE OF THE
CHRISTIAN FAMILY INTHE MODERN WORLD (FamiliarisConsortio)(Vatican trans., 1981), §
34 at 56 ("[Man, who has been called to live God's wise and loving design in a responsible
manner, is an historical being who day by day builds himself up through his many free decisions; and so he knows, loves and accomplishes moral good by stages of growth."); JOHN
FINNIS, FUNDAMENTALS OF ETHICS 141 (1983) ("[Olne's free choices ... constitute one the
sort of person... one has made oneself.").
And when one's character is the product of one's own actions the good of deserving
credit for it-for one's good character as well as one's good actions--emerges as another aspect of the good of freedom. See GERMAIN GRISEz, THE WAY OF THE LORD JESUS:
CHRISTIAN MORAL PRINCIPLES (1983) ("One shapes one's own life, one determines one's
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H. Fiduciary RelationshipsPromote Freedom

"Freedom of contract" is a familiar concept: 7' What about "freedom
of the fiduciary relationship"?
Alethia and Agatha may be more free in a fiduciary relationship
than in a Utility Contract. Compare how they stood when Arthur was
their lawyer with how things worked under Roger. Arthur consulted

with them frequently and took their evolving wishes into account; Roger
considered only their choices at the moment of formation. When new
information came to Arthur's attention he communicated it to them;

when a business development occurred he told them about it; when he
felt he had been out of touch for too long he sat down with them. Roger
self, by one's free choices. To be responsible ultimately means to be a self one cannot blame
on heredity, environment, or anything other than one's own free choices.") (footnote omitted).
Another way in which freedom is good is that it is a component of the good of doing any
reasonable thing and "being a player." It is not enough merely to think out what might be
done and what might be achieved, nor enough to see those happy outcomes occur. It is better also actually to do the things one has settled on as worth doing and see the commendable
outcomes occur as a result of one's own actions. Being in jail, and unable to act, would be a
sorry state because it would deprive you of this opportunity. It would be a sorry state even if
some genie brought about the changes in the outer world which you would have sought to
achieve had you been at liberty to act. The good life has much to do with doing things; with
being involved in the maturing of plans into achievements. Freedom is a component of the
good of human action when it is human in the fullest sense; when the person is fully involved
as the author of his acts. Cf. DWORKIN, supra note 167, at 111 ("[W]hat makes a life ours is
that it is shaped by our choices.... The exercise of the capacity of autonomy is what makes
my life mine."). See generally CHRISTINE SWANTON, FREEDOM: A COHERENCE THEORY
40-48 (1992) (discussing the relationship between freedom and "flourishing").
171. See, e.g., Tamar Frankel, The Legal Infrastructureof Markets: The Role of Contract
and Property Law, 73 B.U. L. REV. 389, 394 (1993) ("Contract law represents the freedom to
interact with others, free of government coercion."). See generally F. KESSLER & G.
GILMORE ET AL., CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 6 (3d ed. 1986) ("[A] system of free
contract did not recommend itself solely for reasons of sheer expediency and utilitarianism; it
was deeply rooted in the moral sentiments of the period in which it found strongest expression. The dominant current of belief inspiring nineteenth-century industrial society ...was
the deep-felt conviction that individual and cooperative action should be left unrestrained...."). A widely quoted British opinion stated:
[I]f there is one thing which more than another public policy requires it is that men
of full age and competent understanding shall have the utmost liberty of contracting,
and that their contracts when entered into freely and voluntarily shall be held sacred
and shall be enforced by Courts of justice. Therefore you have this paramount public policy to consider-that you are not lightly to interfere with this freedom of contract.
Printing and Numerical Registering Co. v. Sampson, 19 L.R. Eq. 465 (1875) (opinion of Jessel, M.R.).
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did none of those things. Arthur made it his professional business to
have a good feel for their plans and aspirations; he knew they were not
just out for money and that they aimed to be fair to one another and to
their employees; he paid attention not only to their dictates but to the
purposes and policies behind them. Roger, thinking (like most contractualists) only in terms of expressed preferences, did none of those
things. Arthur represented Alethia and Agatha in a deep sense of the
word. It may be an exaggeration, but not an extreme one, to say that
Arthur was a sort of extension of Alethia and Agatha. No one could say
that about Roger.
Remember the "goods of freedom" described above. Alethia and
Agatha were the authors of their business lives to a greater extent because of Arthur than they were under Roger's lawyering; they were
moral participants in what Arthur did and developed better as moral
people and members of the moral business community.
I. Promotion ofJustice, Virtue and FreedomJustify Many of Fiduciary
Law's Special Characteristics
Recall, then, some of the characteristics of fiduciary law which made
it objectionable to Justice Jurisprudence. Those characteristics often
help the relationship serve justice, enhance virtue, and promote freedom.
1. Nonpositivism
Fiduciary law's nonpositivism-its embrace of rules created by
judges rather than parties-troubled Justice Jurisprudence. He was
positivist about affiliations-reluctant to introduce norms of his own
creation or even aggressively to fill gaps in incomplete contracts-because he believed in teachings of utilitarian ethics and anthropology
which seemed to establish that the parties knew the good of contracting
(utility) and aimed to achieve it with greater skill than he could bring to
bear. These teachings have little relevance to affiliations which aim at
goods other than utility. A judge in a guardianship case can reasonably
apply his own conclusions about the education of a ward and a judge in
a matter involving distribution of assets among class plaintiffs, stockholders, or trust beneficiaries may reasonably improve the fairness of
the distribution.
2. Requirements of Self-Sacrifice
Fiduciary law's requirements of self-sacrifice troubled Justice Juris-
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prudence. Selfishness, not self-sacrifice, he thought, enhances utility in
most relationships; selfishness, not self-sacrifice, directs a price competition which allocates goods and services to those who will derive the most
utility from them.
This kind of market mechanism cannot be applied to the goods of
justice, virtue, and freedom, for two reasons. First, because "market
participants" do not necessarily want more of them: not everyone is in a
position where he wants to be treated justly; not everyone seeks the arduous disciplines of virtue and freedom.
A second point doubts the possibility of determining whether one
"market" system "allocates" goods and services in a way that "maximizes" justice, virtue, or freedom better than another. Any such determination implies some sort of weighing the degree of the good for one
person against the degree of the good for another. Such a determination causes plenty of theoretical difficulty when the asserted good is
pleasure or utility; worse problems loom when it is goods of the sorts involved in fiduciary relations. Requiring self-sacrifice on the part of the
guardian in order to enhance the virtues of the ward may involve enhancing the virtues of the guardian as well. Requiring self-sacrifice on
the part of the lawyer in order to assure that justice is done among participants in a corporation and that their freedom is enhanced may involve some sort of impairment of the freedom of the attorney; but no
convincing analysis can establish that on balance his self-sacrifice is "inefficient."
IX.

CONCLUSION

A. Varieties of Relationalism
Justice Jurisprudence applied "relational positivism" to contracts:
He made the determinations of the parties the dominant consideration.
Relational positivism makes sense when the goal of a relationship is
subjective-known best to the parties and likely to be peculiar to
them-and when the parties are well motivated and well equipped to
pursue it.
Fiduciary law and discourse is "relational semi-positivism": The parties' wills play an important role but the law also applies its own views of
what is appropriate. Relational semi-positivism seems to be appropriate
when the good of the relationship is not entirely subjective or peculiar to
the parties; when the parties are only imperfectly positioned and motivated to pursue that good.
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B. FiduciaryRelationshipsAre Not Contracts
The Delphic Oracle quoted at the outset of this Article seems to
have been correct in suggesting that relations of mutual good faith involve the greatest goods. Mutual good faith and similar fiduciary characteristics lead a relationship to justice and virtue and they enhance
freedom. The contractarians would distance that involvement and impoverish those goods.

